

ANOTHER APPROACH TO CINEMA: BERGSON MINUS DELEUZE

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September, 2004

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ABSTRACT

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In this work, cinema has been investigated philosophically through the ideas of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, who uses Bergson's ideas as a basis in his cinema books *The Time-Image* and *The Movement-Image*. To clarify the effect of Bergson in Deleuze's works, a detailed account of Bergsonian philosophy has been investigated. After stating Bergson's philosophy, the trace of his philosophical terms are revealed in Deleuze's cinema books, and thereby a critique of Deleuze's Bergsonian approach has been developed by pointing out that Deleuze does not consider Bergson's philosophical terms, which are efficient enough to consider cinema philosophically, and implants his own concepts into Bergsonian approach.

Keywords: Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Cinema, Film philosophy, Intuition, The Movement-Image, The Time-Image.

ÖZET

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Bu çalışmada, Henri Bergson ve Bergson'un fikirlerini Hareket-İmge ve Zaman-İmge adlı sinema kitaplarında temel alan Gilles Deleuze'un düşünceleri doğrultusunda sinema felsefi olarak ele alınmıştır. Deleuze'un çalışmalarındaki Bergsoncu etkiyi açığa çıkarabilmek için Bergson felsefesi detaylı olarak incelenmiştir. Bergson'un felsefi yaklaşımı serimlendikten sonra Deleuze'un sinema kitaplarındaki Bergson terimlerinin izi sürülmüş ve Bergsoncu etki açığa çıkarılmıştır. Böylece Deleuze'un sinema felsefesinin değerlendirme noktasında yeterli olabilecek felsefi terimlerinin yeteri kadar değerlendirilmediği ve kendi kavramlarını Bergson felsefesine yerleştirdiği öne sürülerek Deleuze'un Bergson'cu yaklaşımına bir eleştiri geliştirilmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Sinema, Film felsefesi, Sezgi, Hareket İmge, Zaman İmge.

To my family ...

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The importance of time and movement has become more remarkable in modern age than it has ever been. Although the problem of time and space occupies a central role in the history of philosophy since its very beginnings, the emergence of modern phenomena concerning time and movement put those issues to a different and more crucial place. Cinema is one of the most important phenomena of the age that brings new discussions in its own sphere and other areas like arts and philosophy. In this thesis, regarding those interactions, I shall investigate the relation of cinema and philosophy through the works of Henri-Louis Bergson and Gilles Deleuze.

Concerning time and movement, one of the most important philosophers is Henri-Louis Bergson (1859-1941) who has a great influence on thinkers and artists in Europe due to new horizons that he brought to philosophy by introducing or redefining concepts like duration, memory and intuition. With respect to the era in which he lived and in which most of the technical, industrial and political phenomena of modern age occurred, the ideas of Henri Bergson become more and more popular especially due to his ideas on time and space since, time and movement has gained new dimensions and become a part of the industrialized world. New approaches and philosophical understanding of the problematic concerning space and duration that he innovated will be considered in this thesis. In the second chapter entitled “Henri Bergson,” Bergsonian approach to certain philosophical problems is

investigated and his ideas on **metaphysics**, **intuition**, **duration** and **movement** are clarified to expose the significant understanding of duration and motion that Bergson introduces. This chapter explores that duration and motion, Bergson suggests, are not divisible elements, on the contrary, they should be considered as a whole which connotes **change** and **becoming**, and thereby excludes the mathematical understanding of the problems of **time** and **movement**, which holds time and movement as divisible entities, measures them by the laws of spatial plane. In this chapter, we also encounter with Bergsonian definition of matter as **image** and the role of the **memory** in his philosophy.

The third chapter, “Bergson and Cinema,” tries to realize a project through Bergsonian philosophy, and presents an approach toward art, especially toward cinema what is criticized by Bergson as being an example of the way that our intellects work, an example that support the idea that movement and time can be represented with immobile frames.

After examining Henri Bergson’s philosophical approach, another philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), who is one and the foremost philosophers of our age is taken under consideration. His works on cinema, *Cinema I: The Movement Image* (1983) and *Cinema II: The Time Image* (1985) occupies a different part in the history of cinema and philosophy since, he is one of the first philosophers who introduce an area like **film-philosophy**. Deleuze’s cinema books coincided with the development and acceptance of film studies in related fields when institutions founded, and film studies are held as a discipline. Even certain methodological debates, like semiological approach concerning film analysis, were appeared and cinema studies have become a major event in “film industry” following academic studies on film production and film analysis, Deleuze’s approach was - and still is - striking since his

theories on cinema is a theory that analyzes neither the history of cinema nor films; rather it presents the possibility of philosophical thinking through films, that is, images, time and movement (Herzog 1). As Deleuze puts in the famous preface of *The Movement-Image* that cinema books do not

[S]et out to produce a history of the cinema but to isolate certain cinematographic concepts. These concepts are not technical (such as the various kinds of shots or the different camera movements) or critical (for example great genres, the Western, the detective film, the historical film, etc.). Neither are they linguistic, in the sense in which it has been said that the cinema was the universal language, or in the sense in which it has been said that the cinema is a language (ix).

By those books, Deleuze takes the attention of many thinkers in the field of cinema and philosophy and leads to the idea of the interchangeability of those fields.

However, this has been problematic for both wings of the film philosophy since, film analysts are not very accustomed to the philosophers and philosophies that Deleuze refers to, and thinkers on cinema have the difficulty of encountering Deleuze's philosophical notions. Besides, in the realm of philosophy, those books were unusual philosophical works, at least in the area of aesthetics.

Gilles Deleuze, being a Bergsonian philosopher, starts from Bergson's criticism of cinema as an example of the false movement and time that is created by juxtaposed frames. Although Deleuze disagrees with Bergson's critique on cinematographic mechanism, he basically grounds his ideas in *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image* not only on ideas of duration and motion asserted by Henri Bergson but also on his general philosophical approach. Therefore, the mapping of *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2*, encourages us to investigate Bergson's philosophy in detail.

The importance of Bergsonian philosophy in Deleuze's cinema books is not limited with his ideas on cinema, it also has impacts on Deleuze's general approach on

philosophy that also affects cinema books. For this reason, the significance of Bergsonian philosophy for this dissertation is twofold: on the one hand, its affects on *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image* will be taken into consideration; and on the other hand, it will be discussed that the novelties that Bergson brings with his approach could construct another approach to cinema and arts, though he never realized such a project. The examination of Bergson's philosophy also provides the illumination of Deleuzian move toward Bergson and his refiguration of Bergson's ideas in his work. As it will be clarified in the subsection of the fourth chapter "Bergsonism in the Realm of Cinema" of this thesis, Deleuze inserts his own philosophical terms into Bergsonism and reconstructs cinematographical work out of Bergson's concepts, therefore, it is necessary to grasp the Bergsonian philosophy in order to see the Deleuzian project through it. Claire Perkins states:

Deleuze's words here resonate particularly effectively with the sustained commentary he makes on Bergson in the two volumes of *Cinema* dealing with, respectively, the movement-image and the time-image. In these books the "author" is certainly Bergson on the one hand: the areas Deleuze sets up to approach the cinematic image - - movement, image, time, recollection - - are derived from explicit commentaries on Bergson's own thought in, particularly, *Matter and Memory*.

Although Deleuze refers to Bergson very often in cinema books, we will try to reveal hidden and unconcealed Bergson in Deleuze's those works and try to illustrate the possibility to approach cinema from Bergsonian view without the intervention of Deleuze since, our main thesis is that Deleuze does not consider the wide-ranging approach of "Bergsonism," especially Bergson's ideas on intuition, when he criticizes Bergson for making a false statement in asserting that cinematographic mechanism creates an illusion of movement and time. We have to admit that cinema books "present a 'child' of both Bergson and cinema: both terms are there in the text as what each figure has "said" as either philosophy or a history of moving images".

As Perkins puts it, bearing such a child makes her a “monster” that “in belonging to both they can only belong to neither and to nowhere, for the “matching” is in effect a radical decentring” (Perkins).

As it is mentioned, Deleuze’s attempt is considerably new and innovative in the fields of both cinema and philosophy. He is aware of the fact that cinema can open new gates to philosophical discourse and it is rich enough to enlarge some discussions in areas like philosophy, politics and aesthetics. Therefore, his ideas on philosophy join his cinephilia in order to show those possibilities of conjoining mentioned fields.

While introducing the relationship between Bergson and Deleuze in *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image*, we will use main works by both philosophers that we find necessary to consider in this thesis. What those works as cinema books bring to light are basically Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* in which he introduces his ideas on “cinematographic mechanism of thought” which suggests cinema creates false movement and time by using the persistence of vision, and *Matter and Memory* in which Bergson defines matter as image, and which is necessary, for Deleuze, to consider determining cinematographic work through the concepts “movement-image” and “time-image”.

By introducing the approaches of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze we will try to reveal that Deleuze gives special importance to philosophy rather than cinema, and in achieving his aim toward film-philosophy, he deforms Bergsonian understanding for the sake of presenting his own approach. In this respect, the parallelism of Deleuzian philosophical approach to Bergsonism and the interchangeability of the terms of both

philosophers will be presented, and the ideas of Bergson will be applied to the field of cinema without the effect of Deleuze.

CHAPTER II

HENRI BERGSON

Henri-Louis Bergson is one of the contemporary French philosophers whose life coincides with World War I and the political atmosphere of World War II. He worked in Collège de France and he became well known with his doctrines on **duration** and *élan vital*. Before calling attention to these issues I shall mention his methods of philosophy that are related with his epistemological approach, his philosophical method in general and duration and motion in particular.

To understand Bergsonian philosophy and to consider its importance concerning our issue we ought to begin by examining his epistemological approach that is revealed in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* in which Bergson studies the ways of making metaphysics and distinguishes his understanding of metaphysics from previous understandings that create philosophical problems. At the beginning of *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, he defines his epistemological approach that paves the way for his methodology including his dualism. This issue is important for the project in this study since Bergson's ideas on epistemological realm is directly related with his ideas on duration and motion on which he builds his theory as a critical approach. He states this as an introduction to metaphysics since, by doing that, he draws the limits of making metaphysics.

2.1. Epistemology – The Way to Metaphysics

According to Henri Bergson, there are two different ways of producing the knowledge of things. The first way is to know things from outside and the second is to know them from within. The former way of knowledge presupposes a mechanical, mathematical thinking that can be traced back to Descartes and even ancient Pythagoreans whose philosophies are based on mathematical principles¹. The latter method is to know intuitively which will be clarified under the title of “Intuition”. As Bergson puts in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*:

The first implies that we move round the object; the second, that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the relative; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the absolute (Hartman ed. 65).

As Bergson himself stated, relative kind of knowledge differentiates things on the basis of space, and hence depends on perspective and symbolical representation, though absolute gives the true nature and knowledge of things and could not be considered in spatial terms. This epistemological approach is important since, Bergson builds almost all his philosophical attitude on this dualism. By distinguishing relative knowledge from the absolute, Bergson states a striking **dualism** which paves the way to solution of basic problems and paradoxes of time and movement.

¹ René Descartes defines matter as *res extensa* which means ‘extended substance’. By doing this he foregrounds the matter something that has extension, that is length, breadth and height. This system determines movement and other material properties by extension. He also claims that physics should invoke only the ‘clear and distinct’ ideas of mathematics. One of the most important propositions of Cartesian philosophy is the doctrines on motion that is created by immobile instants and the motion appears as a result of the divine interference of God who is the ‘primary cause of the motion’ and who provides the continuity of it (The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 122,123).

Related with those ideals stated above, Bergson turns his face to ancient paradoxes of time and movement that are stated by Zeno of Elea due to the fact that the well-known paradoxes of Zeno could be regarded as one of the best examples of this dilemma based on time and motion. As it is known, Zeno of Elea, who was a successor of Parmenides, developed some paradoxes in order to create a *reductio ad absurdum* against Pythagorean *école* that tries to explain movement with the laws of mathematics. He asserted those arguments in order to show the contradictory nature of the terms multiplicity, change and space which cannot be used together to explain the universe (Sahakian 20-23). Although Zeno's aim was different many philosophers and thinkers refer back to his paradoxes in many respects.

The most famous Zeno paradox mentions the race between Achilles and tortoise. He assumes a race between Achilles, who is the fastest human being and a tortoise in which Achilles does a favor to tortoise by letting him start and proceed first, due to the confidence that he would pass tortoise in any way. However, Zeno puts that it is impossible for Achilles to pass the tortoise in such a race when the rules of mathematics are considered in explaining reality. If the mathematical thinking of a distance that is composed of infinite number of points is taken into consideration, the statement turns out to be true that Achilles could not pass the tortoise since he has to pass half of the way the tortoise has passed and before that he has to pass the half of that half and so on. As a result, when considered in this way Achilles only passes the points that tortoise has passed and never reaches it. However, reality proves us the opposite. This space-based thinking of movement creates an illusion that hides true nature of reality, and this is the main concern of Henri Bergson in his approach to paradoxes of Zeno. According to Bergson, the origin of the illusion that is created by the Zeno paradoxes is to consider both time and movement in a linear plane that

suggests time and movement “coincide with the line which underlies them”. These paradoxes emerge as the conclusion of this logic which creates an analogy between time and movement and subdivisions of line, “in treating them like that line” (Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 191).

The roots of this dilemma, as we mentioned above, lie in the idea of considering mathematical rules as the rules of nature and applying them to real nature of things. This ideology is embodied in Cartesian philosophy, which is one of the main targets of criticism of Bergsonian philosophy. For this reason, Bergson differentiates two kinds of knowing things the one of which follows the line of Cartesian and even Kantian philosophy², and the other reveals itself as Bergson’s philosophical approach and method that is intuition. For grounding his criticism on the former line and for suggesting a new methodology of making philosophy other than mathematical method, Bergson offers that intuition is a method which is the only way of understanding the true nature of reality. Knowing things from within, grasping the real nature of them depends on this method that excludes any other medium in the process of knowing.³ If the paradoxes of Zeno are taken into consideration by this approach the problem becomes a problem of epistemology and metaphysics.

Another problem that arises as a result of thinking by rules of geometry and space that we mentioned above is the problem concerning movement. There is another Zeno paradox regarding this issue which is called the “flying arrow paradox”. If we take a flying arrow, says Zeno, targeted to something, and if we think in terms of mathematics, it is impossible for arrow to move since, it has to be motionless in

² Kantian philosophy and Bergsonian criticism of it will be considered later.

³ This point will be evaluated in my chapter on “intuition”.

every point, and cannot move. If it is considered this way, arrow has to be at rest at a given point and therefore, motionless at every point, and all the time. Bergson states:

Yes again, if the arrow, which is moving, ever coincides with a position, which is motionless. But the arrow never is in any point of its course. The most we can say is that it might be there, in this sense, that it passes there and might stop there. It is true that if it did stop there, it would be at rest there, and at this point it is no longer movement that we should have to do with. The truth is that if the arrow leaves the point A to fall down at the point B, its movement AB is as simple, as indecomposable, in so far as it is movement, as the tension of the bow that shoots it. As the shrapnel, bursting before it falls to the ground, covers the explosive zone with an indivisible danger, so the arrow which goes from A to B displays with a single stroke, although over a certain extent of duration, its indivisible mobility (Creative Evolution, 308,309).

This paradox, according to Bergson, arises as a result of false problematization, asking wrong questions that are not applicable to the reality. The relative way of producing knowledge, as a result, remains paradoxical when compared with the reality that can only be reached by intuition and defined as the absolute. As Zeno's paradoxes also show, the reality of things are not partial, are not depended on some point of views and cannot be evaluated with rules or laws other than its own⁴. On the contrary, although the mechanical knowledge has pragmatic, practical easiness, it is not efficient enough to explain the nature of movement and time.

For Bergson, these two systems of knowledge work independently in comprehending the nature of things. The one serves for practical ends and provides an easiness in considering pragmatic issues, for example, used in technology and engineering. And the other serves to show the real nature and work of things as we will see in the case of motion and duration. However, according to Bergson, the reality lies at the absolute and the juxtaposition of the moments could not give the real nature of

⁴ This ideal can be considered as the basis of Bergson's criticism of Kant who considers the nature under the categories of mind.

duration, or motion is not the totality of immobile points. In this respect, absolute can only be comprehended by intuition.

2.2. Intuition

Intuition as the method of Bergson's philosophy stands at a crucial point to understand other elements like duration, space. Undoubtedly, intuition has considerable differences with respect to every day usage of the word or the mystic connotations of the word. It is claimed to be a method, a way of philosophizing in Bergsonian philosophy that distinguishes itself from pre-philosophical understandings of the concept. Therefore, what gives intuition such a great importance lies in the breaking point that separates Henri Bergson from preceding philosophers, especially from Immanuel Kant who presupposes time and space as intuitively pre-philosophical concepts. His insistence on comprehending reality by a special experience, that is intuition, could make him considered as an empiricist. However, his arguments on intuition cannot simply be considered as empiricism. On the contrary, his empiricism is quite different. As he proposes, "true empiricism is the one which purposes to keep as close to the original itself as possible, to probe more deeply into its life ... and this true empiricism is the real metaphysics" (Creative Mind 175). In this respect, empiricism, or metaphysics, is not a passive experience rather it foresees the entering into the reality, active and need some effort to achieve it.

This effort is its second, positive facet: radical empiricism metaphysical to the extent that focuses on the individual specificity of its object – *the singularity of the individual* that can only be sensed rather than imagined. Metaphysics is not the contemplation of an alternative reality but the perception of a heightened reality, a perception Bergson eventually calls 'intuition' (Linstead and Mullarkey 10-11).

In this respect, intuition is not a type of immediate knowledge and not a mystical experience, rather it provides to know things from within, to come face to face with reality and to reach absolute knowledge about that reality. In doing that we do not need to look at faculties other than senses. As Linstead and Mullarkey put it, this argument proposed by Bergson is a departure from Kantian and Platonic intuition that needs an extra intellectual faculty to reach reality or to reach ideas (in Platonic sense) that are not perceived through senses. Kant covers experience with intellect and presupposes categories that reveal the relations of nature especially spatial and temporal relation of space and time with matter. Although this attempt can also be considered as a sort of intuition, Bergson makes emphasis on the importance of experience that gives the true nature of things by intuition not through intellect or any other medium. Kant uses such a critical method in order to ground science with the intellect and defines the possibilities of making science whose grounds are short circuited by many philosophers like David Hume. As Bergson puts “This is what Kant expresses by saying that all our intuitions are sensuous, or, in other words, infra intellectual. And this would have been admitted, indeed, if our science presented in all its parts an equal objectivity.” (Bergson, CE 359). This sentence reveals the importance of objectivity in the process of making science. The whole deal can be considered as reaching that objectivity which is at dangerous, slippery grounds due to the agent, that is human being, that makes science and the agent of subjectivity. In contrast, Bergson relies on sense and perception rather than intellect that he proposes that we could find the way to intuition. “He encourages us to ‘plunge’ and ‘insert our will’ into perception, ‘deepening’, ‘widening’ and ‘expanding’ it as we do” (Linstead and Mullarkey 11).

As mentioned earlier, Bergson claims that the method of sciences and logic is inadequate to consider the reality. The ideology of Enlightenment, the conceptual thought has only practical ends and sufficient to understand what is not the subject of becoming since scientific knowledge have the claim of being precise for all times and spaces in the world. However, change and becoming is a part of reality, or in other words, the nature of reality includes change and becoming. Bergson in this respect eludes conceptual thought and asserts, “Only intuition, which is akin to instinct, can penetrate to the vital force that underlies all activity and change” (Philosophy of Recent Times, 64). This can also be proven by contrasting the hypotheses of the history of science that always change due to the novelties in the field. And therefore, the ever changing things cannot be considered by permanent theories. This is one of the reasons that Bergson separates biology as the science of living creatures and physics.

Intuitive method, according to Bergson, is therefore, the starting point for philosophy which provides the closest relationship with things. In *Philosophical Intuition*, fourth chapter of *Creative Mind* Bergson puts that philosophical intuition is the method of philosopher even if he or she is not aware of it. Bergson claims that a philosopher finds the roots of his/her philosophy by intuition which is simple. The complexity of the philosophy begins at the point when this intuitive knowledge is tried to be explained by words or concepts, or represented in terms of language. To try to explain the intuitive element makes complex what is simple in nature, and this complexity bears other complexities when they are trying to be solved. And the way to philosophy is something in between finding and losing the intuition. Approaching to it and digressing from it. As Bergson puts:

Intuition doubtless admits of many degrees of intensity, and philosophy many degrees of depth; but the mind once brought back to real duration will already be alive with intuitive life and its knowledge of things will already be philosophy. Instead of discontinuity of moments replacing one another in an infinitely divided time, it will perceive the continuous fluidity of real time which flows along, indivisible. Instead of surface states covering successively some neutral stuff and maintaining with it the mysterious relationship to phenomenon to substance, it will seize upon one identical change which keeps ever lengthening as in a melody where everything is becoming but where the becoming, being itself substantial, has no need of support. No more inert states, no more dead things; nothing but the mobility of which the stability of life is made. A vision of this kind, where reality appears as continuous and indivisible, is on the road which leads to philosophical intuition (CM 127).

This quotation is also an evidence of Bergsonian approach that foresees change, mobility, and duration that are among the key concepts of this study in considering Henri Bergson's philosophy. Intuition, as appeared above, is the only method of understanding the nature of those realities independent of any medium. Therefore, as we will see later in this thesis, Bergsonian philosophy is a philosophy of becoming or flux.

For Bergson, as it is indicated above, intuition is a question of finding true duration. As will be examined later, true duration is a flow and it has nothing to do with the instants or moments as subsections of time. Intuition also defines the life of the spirit, which "posits and constitutes problems (*qui pose et contitue les problèmes*) rather than analytically evaluating their formal configuration and truth value (Borradori, footnote 11 17). It is the only way to understand the vital force of living beings.

Bergson claims that some philosophers believe that intuition have a supra-intellectual faculty. Philosophers believe that time and intelligence work together and to go outside of one of them means to go beyond the other, that is if one goes beyond the borders of intelligence it denotes the going beyond the time. He criticizes them by not seeing that "intellectualized time is space, that the intelligence works upon the

phantom of duration not on duration itself, that the elimination of time is the habitual, normal, commonplace act of our understanding, that the relativity of our knowledge of the mind is direct result of this fact” (CM 30-31). The passage from intelligence to time or from absolute to relative is not a question of excluding time, on the contrary one should have to turn back to real duration and mobility in order to find the essence of reality.

Intuition saves reality of things both from construction and reconstruction, turns them out to be “touched, penetrated, lived” experience, “and the problem [...] between realism and idealism, instead of giving rise to interminable metaphysical discussions, is solved, or rather, dissolved by intuition” (Bergson, MM 69).

However, Bergsonian project is not so easy to be expressed and applied as a philosophical project since intuition excludes conceptualization. Although he defines the terms of intuitive knowledge of things he states the difficulty of transmitting it. As Bergson states in *Philosophical Intuition* expression, or in other words, representation with words creates the obstacle to understand the reality. The more the expression is forced the more reality become complex. This is one of the main problems of philosophy. Bergson states that:

[...] something simple, infinitely simple, so extraordinary simple that the philosopher has never succeeded in saying it. He could not formulate what he had in mind without feeling himself obliged to correct his formula, then to correct his correction: thus, from theory to theory, correcting when he thought he was completing, what he has accomplished, by a complication which provoked more complication, by developments heaped upon developments, has been to convey with an increasing approximation the simplicity of his original intuition (CM 109).

On the contrary, the truth is simpler than the means of expression define it. When other mediums like language in elaborating the absolute is used, we fall far apart

from the real knowledge of things and deal with the expressions, representations etc. As Bergson puts it “of intelligence and of language, is nearer to the attitude of science than to that of philosophy” (CM 127). Language is full of abstractions and generalities that deceive us as if they are the real indicators of reality. It shows the habitual tendency of our minds as true classifications although they have only habitual, and of course, practical ends. The stored up notions in language, therefore nothing but obstacles of comprehending, are in fact is different from that the language indicates. Perhaps the most illustrative example is the names of colors that are classified under the same name even though they have nuances in the spectrum. This illustrates the work of our intelligence as well as language⁵. This shows that language generalizes the differences. Instead of applying the means of expression we should turn our face to that which is intuitive which supposes a kind of affirmation. In this respect, it is a process of affirmation rather than explanation.⁶

2.2.1. Concerning the Problem of Problem – False Problems

As mentioned above the method of Bergsonian philosophy is intuition and to understand the real nature of things one should apply it as a method to touch reality. As Bergson claims when intuition is not used as a method there arises misunderstandings and false problematizations as in the case of duration and motion when considered in terms of mathematical rules. According to Bergson, history of philosophy is full of those false problematizations that are resulted from the false approaches toward reality and the complexity of transmitting the real nature of things with the means of expression.

⁵ This idea appears in *Philosophical Intuition* as Bergson examines George Berkeley’s idealism. Bergson asserts that “[...] under the name of general ideas we set up as realities the names that we have given to groups of objects or perceptions more or less artificially constituted by us on the plane of matter” (CM, 117)

Initially, Bergson mentions about some false problems that appear as a result of the logical understandings, or, it could be claimed, (mis)understandings of the reality. He defends that solutions that could be derived from geometrical rules are ones that have no value as solutions since, the process of deducing answers from false questions is a worthless struggle in addition to being erroneous. Scientific and mathematical approaches, as we examined, determine things in accordance with the presuppositions that is developed in those realms. As Bergson states “[n]o important truth will be achieved by the prolongation of an already acquired truth. We shall have to give up crowding universal science potentially into one principle” (CM 32). This also shows Bergson’s approach toward reality that he defends as multiplicity and singularity that do not exclude each other. Derived from this ideal, he also affirms the multiplicity of questions, and as a result, the answers that should not be reduced to generalized, abstracted questions that summarize and assimilate things under a category or a concept. As a consequence, to create abstractions and generalizations lead to false problematizations and false examinations of reality⁷.

Related with mathematical approach aforementioned, Bergson defines another sort of problems that arise as a consequence of questions concerning origin and value of general ideas. According to Bergson, those problems appear in every philosophical assertion and need particular solutions in every case. He states that “[p]erhaps it would be advisable to ask oneself, before any discussion, if these ideas do really constitute a genus and if it would not be precisely in dealing with general ideas that one would have to guard against generalities” (CM 52). As it is shown in discussing Bergson’s idea on language, creating generalities that is to represent similarities

⁶ The idea of affirmation, although it is not very clear, appears in most of Bergson’s work. The same idea also appears in Gilles Deleuze’s works through Nietzschean philosophy.

under one concept deceives us since, for Bergson, there could not be a unique answer for generalized questions. They disregard the singularity of problems and solutions.

Bergson states that, another group of false problems appear as a result of the existence of solutions before problems, which is to say that problems are put that already have answers. The solutions of the problems exist beforehand since creating genius problems is a difficult task to achieve as well as to manage. In this respect, the problem creating process is a reversed process that first finds the solution not the question and formulates question accordingly. According to Bergson, those answers are either hidden or covered up and “[t]he only thing left to do is to *uncover* it” (CM 51). On the contrary, stating a real problem has nothing to do with uncovering, it is a process of inventing and/or creating. When the answer exists before the question the question should be formulized in order to explain the **nature** of the **questioned** thing. For example, we have trees all around, and the tree is an answer or the question “What is this?” or “What is tree?” Although by intuition we know the tree, the questions formulized in this way, and the answers of this formulization become to create complexities and misinterpretations since, the question, the tree, is tried to be constructed again in accordance with the answer.

To consider a thing with some other thing as if they have a direct relation or as if one includes or precedes the other are also among the false problems. To illustrate, Bergson gives the example of, what he calls “artificial terms” of “pleasure” and “happiness” which are usually thought together. The boundary between them is a false statement, a habitual combination. This habitual derivation that is applied to almost every kind of, let’s say, co-appearances or successive appearances lead us to

⁷ As we examined the paradoxes appeared as a result of mathematical consideration of things we will not repeat those problems and problems concerning duration and motion which will be considered

create relations between the terms of the event. This is the reason of thinking the rules of one term as to be applicable to the other, one can be derived from the other or one is the cause of the other.

Related with vital force there appears another set of false problems that arise as a result of trying to fill some kind of a gap that our intelligence is not able to explain. God, matter and mind are among these kinds of problems. This set of false problems finds its roots in the infinite chain of causal relation in searching for the first cause. However, the causal chain can be derived to infinity that creates an incredible amount of causes and effects. To keep away from the vertigo of such an incredible regression we should have to stop at some point not because questions on causes end, but just because our “imagination finally shuts its eyes, as though over the abyss, to avoid dizziness” (CM 62). To the point we stopped we give a transcendental cause, such as god, that is capable of giving a pseudo-explanation of what our imagination fails to compete. It is the same in thinking order through disorder. In order to avoid the idea of nothingness, the idea of disorder placed to explain the idea of order. Disorder or a state of chaos, then becomes a preceding state out of which order is organized; the view which also connotes that order is preferable. For this reason, instead of giving a full account of disorder, it is used as a pre-condition of order. In second introduction of *Creative Mind* subtitled as *Stating the Problems*, Bergson affirms:

The idea of absolute disorder is contradictory, or rather, inexistent, a mere word by which one designates an oscillation of the mind between two different orders: in which case it is absurd to suppose that disorder logically or chronologically precedes order (65).

later as separate chapters.

According to Bergson, the understanding that is the cause of this set of false questions, defining something by its absence or rather its contradictory conditions resulted from the ancient skepticism, Kantian philosophy and theories of knowledge. According to him what Kant tried to do in *Critique of Pure Reason* is “to explain how a particular order is superadded to supposedly incoherent materials” in order to foreground science and scientific knowledge (Bergson, CM 65). In this respect, Kantian philosophy only creates an illusion. Once human thought freed from those illusions, then it could reach the real nature of things both through science and metaphysics. In this respect Bergsonian philosophy embraces the other possibilities, or as he says, impossibilities, for the will determine the one but not excludes others, or, in other words, multiplicity is always there.

We should note that false problems are the results of a characteristic of human beings due to the fact that first principle of biology is *primum vivere* which organizes our faculties in order to maintain life. As a consequence of this principle which creates easiness in our life “[m]emory, imagination, conception and generalization in short, are not “for nothing, for pleasure” (Creative Mind 53). In this respect, they all have a place in our life and are not meaningless. All those terms put by Bergson work in life and help humanity, or more generally living creatures to continue their life in ease, those terms, although criticized in some respects, are useful and necessary for life. For example, a general idea, or abstraction prevents us from dealing with small differences, or abstractions provide, at least technological developments. Otherwise, there should be a theory for every particular event or occurrence. And general ideas are useful to know how to deal with the multiplicity of the world. Regarding this, Bergson does not condemn science; moderately he opens new paths to science to reach the absolute with metaphysics. For him, after Enlightenment in order to

foreground scientism, intuitive method is hindered or stopped. He also criticizes metaphysics that only deals with abstract ideas. He admits that the way to intuition is not easy to be passed and carried on. This is why philosophers give up dealing with intuitive and sacrifice the true method for the sake of achieving something in a limited time and effort the result of which misleads us in the realm of intuition. Intuition, becoming and evolution are never ending processes and to deal with them requires more than a lifetime, or perhaps it never ends. In intuitive method there could not be **enough** since “one will never made enough preparatory studies, never have learned enough” (Bergson, CM 67). To think of a science seems to be a difficult struggle, though it includes possibility⁸, singularity and multiplicity. Therefore, for Bergson, no philosopher ought to have the aim of describing the whole.

With regard to those false credence of philosophy, movement and change are hold from a false perspective that presupposes movement and duration are composed of immobile sections, as we examined in epistemology chapter related with Zeno paradoxes and will be explained in detail later. Those false problematizations find their foundation also in language, as we mentioned, that supports illusory states. Language maintains the intellectual tendencies, or habits that are resulted from them. Using language is to describe or define what is experienced intuitively as a complex issue. Language abstracts, generalizes, but in contrast, duration, and intuition exclude abstraction and generalization. However, it ought to be admitted that language is another element that we use as natural as we walk. Humanity is “organized for the life” and language is a part of that organization that is directed with the intelligence, “the human way of thinking” (Bergson, CM 80, 78). According to Bergson,

⁸ What Bergson means by possibility is something that has not occurred yet. It does not retrospective but it is related with the thing that comes next, throws a light to the future. Instead of dealing with

intelligence is a kind of instinct like that of animals and instincts. The tendency of the intellect is to organize, fabricate, create mechanical illusions and it uses language to rescue science by creating habits, beliefs and traditions. Therefore the development of science and technique is directed by intelligence not with intuition. Though science and mechanical art are in the sphere of pure intellect, metaphysics is in the field of intuition.

Instead of using intuition in the realm of metaphysics philosophers usually apply other methods that give rise to **badly stated** problems. This set of problems, “[...] frequently resolve themselves of their own accord when correctly stated, or else are problems formulated in terms of illusion which disappear as soon as the terms of the formula are more closely examined” (CM 95-96). The most striking example is the space when badly stated is seen as that contains things. On the contrary, Bergson asserts that, space has been extracted from things. This ideal that Bergson criticizes could find its roots in Kantian philosophy. He puts that Kant thinks time and space analogously. For him, this approach gives an ideality to space and Kant, by putting time in the same plane with the space, creates another problem rather than solving it (CE 204-206).

To think emptiness in terms of fullness creates another badly stated question that is even non-existent. Nonexistent problems are the kinds in which elements are considered as a matter of more or less relations which create a confusion to understand the essence of the problematic and are derived from a consideration of comparison that makes us to go far away from the essence. At this point, Bergson mentions about pseudo-problems that arise as a result of either the “theories on

possibility which is not yet come we have to deal with the real which is “created as something unforeseeable and now” (Bergson, CM, 101).

being” or the “theories on knowledge”. In the former pseudo-problem, there lies the differentiation between being and non-being and appears a tendency to construct being over the idea of non-being. The question concerning being and existence causes the search for a cause that could be derived to infinity and dizziness. For Bergson, to avoid such dizziness and nonsense, our intellect stops somewhere asking for causes that leads to a transcendental cause like God. However, the problem of being has little importance since this problem could never be solved and should never be asked, and ought to be left aside. Another philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein formulates this false problematization in *Philosophical Investigations* by quoting a passage from Augustine: “What then is time, I know well enough, what it is provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled” (Wittgenstein 89). Sharing those ideas with Bergson, Wittgenstein claims that the territory of philosophy is to remove the ambiguous problems, illnesses from its own field. And to do this, philosophers should understand the limits of language clearly. They should give up asking wrong questions and try to answer them. For example it should not be treated as same to ask, “What is a tree?” and to ask, “What is time?”. However, that is the hole in which most of the philosophers fall. As Wittgenstein also indicates, we are dealing with wrong - in Bergsonian term false - questions and try to find answer to them.

The problem of **being** and **nothing** is one of the most important dilemmas of metaphysics. Bergson puts that the image of nothing is not possible since, we always perceive something either within or without. We can imagine the absence of the outer world around us, or our own absence yet, we cannot imagine the absence of both. This is another illusion that misleads our knowledge. According to him, the

term **nothing** arises from the expectation of human being, or in other words indicates the absence of some kind of expectation:

We say then that there is nothing more, meaning by that, that what exists does not interest us, that we are interested in what is no longer there or in what might have been there. The idea of absence, or of nothingness or of nothing, is therefore inseparably bound to that of suppression, real or eventual, and the idea of suppression is itself only an aspect of the idea of substitution (Bergson, CM 97).

The substitution works with the reversal or negation of subject into question like being and nonbeing as well as order and disorder. It is also the same in the problem of **possibility** and **reality**. The general idea on possible and real is that possible precedes the real and needs some conditions to be realized, or as Bergson puts it, it is a phantom waiting its hour. However, it is usually forgotten that the reality opens the gates to possibilities. Even if the opposite is asserted for the nature, one should regard the creative work in the domain of possible and virtual. Bergson gives Shakespeare's *Hamlet* as an example to illustrate the case and he claims that *Hamlet* could be possible before Shakespeare realizes it. However, it is *reductio ad absurdum* to suppose that *Hamlet* was possible with its all lines and words etc. When put in that way, creativity underlying the work of art, changes the approach toward possible and real. According to him, "it is real which makes itself possible, and not the possible which becomes real." Bergson insists, "I believe in the end we shall consider it evident that the artist in executing his work is creating the possible as well as the real. Whence comes it then one might hesitate to say the same thing for nature?" From this point we can designate the similarity between Nietzsche and Bergson, since Bergson also suggests the affirmation of nature (CM 103-104).

False problems construct the stable by means of the unstable, motion by means of immobility and real by means of practice. There lie the illusions and paradoxes

between the thing that is conceived by intuition and conceived by intellect. For instance, even though the idea of disorder has entirely practical ends, it is held as something real that precedes order, or the absence of order, though they are different in kind. Bergson claims “if we prove that the idea of the nothing, in the sense in which we take it when we oppose it to that of existence, is a pseudo-idea, the problems that are raised around it would become pseudo-problems” (CE 277). If philosophy, according to Bergson, could get rid of those pseudo-problems, it would clear the way of intuition and true metaphysics as well as sciences.

We can overcome false problems just by using intuitive method. As Bergson states “[...] as soon as we have intuitively perceived the true, our intellect recovers itself, corrects itself, intellectually formulates its error” (CM 64), or in short one should consult intuition in order to overcome the difficulties raised by intellect, thereby we can solve false problems.

2.2.2. Intuition-Whole-Parts

If we take numbers as an example to show the reality between intuition, whole and its units we could encounter that every number is one when we think in terms of intuition. However, they are at the same time many when we think in terms of intellect. In this sense, numbers represent unity and multiplicity at the same time depending on the point of view we hold (Bergson, TFW 75-76). We can call a thousand of trees a forest. It is both forest and trees from different perspectives and different practices. Each tree is somehow distinct from one another and we cannot take into account them as a unity which makes them merge into one another. However, as Bergson puts it, even if they are identical, they are distinct with respect to the space they extend. They are different but somehow create a unity with respect

to the notion of forest. Since the distinction is a result of spatial differentiation Bergson puts that it misleads us as if we think time as juxtaposition or as succession.

What leads to misunderstanding on this point seems to be the habit we have fallen into of counting in time rather than in space. In order to imagine number 50, for example, we repeat all the numbers starting from unity, and we have arrived at fiftieth, we believe we have built up the number in duration and in duration only (Bergson, TFW 78).

Bergson warns us against thinking unity as if this unity is the whole. We have to notice that what he defines by whole is not the totality of the units like in the relation between duration and instants in which the totality of instants are not able to give the real duration. The whole is that which we **master** by the intuition of mind. When we speak of unity of number we do not imply the sum or addition of numbers, or say units that create the number taken into account. But the number itself as a whole is “irreducible unit.” (Bergson, TFW 80). However, one should not forget that this unity is multiplicity as well, unique in terms of intuition and multiple in terms of space. Unity is pure and simple. “...[I]t is possible to divide the unit into as many parts as we like, shows that we regard it as extended” (Bergson, TFW 82). Like in the example of time understood as multiplicity and as duration. We will consider time-duration relationship in detail later.

2.3. Duration

Time becomes an important problem in modern ages. Although, from ancient time to our age humanity has found the ways of measuring time, it was not as vital as it is in this era. Henri-Louis Bergson’s importance first arises from his ideas on time since, he brings a novelty to the concept of time. He criticizes the mainstream ideas of time that divide time into its parts as seconds, milliseconds, months etc., which suggest that time is composed of those variables, and constituted by the juxtaposition of

them. Analyzing this understanding of time, Bergson affirms a new terminology and a new understanding on that issue.

The main assertion Bergson tries to put forward is that real time has no variables and should be considered as a whole in itself since, whole is not the totality of its parts, on the contrary, it is more than that totality. Therefore, he suggests the concept of *duration* (*durée*) to define the real nature of time. Separating time into its elements is related with the mechanistic understanding of our minds. It is also an artificial effort made for practical ends. Duration is a flux which is indivisible. The previous understandings of time are the symbolization of reality, those in fact it has no reality itself. Duration is that which flows, unfolds, though symbolization conceals it (Bergson, CE 4).

Duration is a continuous progress which is not divisible into moments and which excludes measurement. It is a mechanistic illusion to consider time as a means of measurement. However, this understanding is not totally rejected by Bergson. As it will be considered later, this is a result of a tendency of the things. It is a difference between reality and artificial symbolization of that reality. This symbolization brings along the act of measurement. Measurement has practical ends and works in the field of science in which measurement is essential. "Time as dealt with by the astronomer and by physicist, does indeed *seem* to be measurable and therefore homogeneous" (Bergson, TFW 107). Undoubtedly, measurement of time presupposes homogeneous, equal elements of moments. This illusion arises from the consideration of time in analogy with space, that is to determine time by laws of space. What is measured as time, separated in clocks are the abstract form of it, or illustrative representation of duration. Time divided as parts is something different from real *durée*, is in this respect, homogeneous and not heterogeneous as duration is. Homogeneity also

presupposes equal parts that are symmetrically replaced one after another, for example, a moment is sixty seconds that are all sixty milliseconds. However, we have to note that this divisibility belongs to the rules of space and spatial thinking. When time is considered with those rules of space we fall into the relative and regard time as space. As Borradori points out, in works of Bergson, it could be claimed that the basic point is the asymmetry between time and space (4). Symmetry and homogeneity are applicable to space and spatial objects. However, duration is asymmetrical and heterogeneous (Lorand 402). Therefore, laws of space and geometrical object are not applicable to duration.

Bergson claims that the flowing of seconds one after another is not a means of measurement as it is thought. In *Time and Free Will* he states that: “When I follow with my eyes on the dial of a clock the movement of the hand which corresponds to the oscillations of the pendulum, I do not measure duration, as seems to be thought: I merely count simultaneities, which is very different” (107-108). If we left pendulum and oscillations aside, we could reach the heterogeneous duration which excludes successive, numerical relations and moments external to one another. As a result of the comparison between real duration and time arises the “symbolic representation of duration, derived from space. Duration thus assumes the illusory form of a homogeneous medium, and the connecting link between these two terms, space and duration, is simultaneity, which might be defined as the intersection of time and space” (Bergson, TFW 110).

To think duration in homogeneous terms divides it into points which are called past and present as successive simultaneities. Past and present create differentiation which produces an interval between two moments that leads to the idea of divisibility of time. Our consciousness replaces symbolical representation of time and makes it

homogeneous. As mentioned above, when time becomes homogeneous, homogeneous units become successive and remain external for one another. When our consciousness realizes this symbolization, there appear two aspects: the first approach is to hold the elements as the same and the second is to make a new organization out of those identical elements as we do it in time as holding sixty beats of pendulum as a second and do not count each beat. "Hence the possibility of setting out in space, under the form of numerical multiplicity, what we have called a qualitative multiplicity, and of regarding the one as the equivalent of the other." (Bergson, TFW 124). Perception organizes the motion and memory, facilitates it by taking former positions into account and causes them to permeate. As emphasized before, this operation on motion creates the illusion of thinking duration in the very same process and **projected it into space**.

One of the most important results of thinking time homogeneous is to separate past from present and future. However, duration excludes this understanding by its own nature and by the work of our memory. Our memory or memory including history is something that illustrates that the past extending into the present and future.

According to Bergson it is an unfolding process of history. Undoubtedly, memory is not just composed of conscious states, but also there are unconscious states that are known partially. Although distinct ideas of unconsciousness are not known certainly, the past stays there in the memory and preserves its existence. This also provides experiencing a thing for once.

Duration leads to a chaotic ambience in which history and/or events have neither a starting point nor an end to be measured, pointed out. Nonetheless, this does not mean that things do not have a starting point and an end. From Bergsonian point of view those points gain different meanings rather than being a geometrical code on a

line. Conversely, they are parts of a multiplicity which is the multiplicity of duration(s). From this point of view, it could be asserted that, Bergson's philosophy brings a different perspective to history reading and writing that dethrones cause-effect chain, or, in other words, a kind of determinism.

Accumulation of past into present and future illustrates that time is not a divisible element since there is already past in the point of division; present and future contains past. Past continues its survival by projecting itself into present and future. This can be asserted as the reason of Bergson's use of the term **unfolding** instead of asserting a linear understanding of time.

We could observe the unfolding of past in the very debatable element of future predictions. Although scientists claim that prediction is a proof of scientific rules and laws that foresees the future happenings, Bergson objects this idea from two points of view. He suggests that, if time is something infinitely divisible, as it is understood scientifically, there could not be prediction since, time is infinitely divisible in science since, the intervals between two moments are infinitely divisible. Bergson explains this kind of prediction as follows:

...when the astronomer predicts, e.g., an eclipse, he does something of this kind: he shortens infinitely the intervals of duration, as these do not count for science, and thus perceives in a very short time - a few seconds at the most - a succession of simultaneities which may take up for several centuries for the concrete consciousness, compelled to live the intervals instead of merely counting their extremities (Bergson, TFW 116-117).

As it is emphasized above, prediction also foregrounds that scientific rules that are true so that the prediction is possible. However, according to Bergsonian approach prediction is possible not because of the homogeneity of time but because of the existence of memory that preserves past in itself and informs us the possible

occurrences of periodic events with this ability. In this respect, to foresee is to project past experience to future. This idea can be illustrated by David Hume's definition of habit. What he calls **habit** is habitual assumption that the repeated events would continue to be repeated in the future. As a result of that habitual nature when we see sun we suppose warmth. These are not the rules of the nature but our habit of supposing things in causal relation. Hume supposes, thus, that the methods of science, which are deduction and –specifically – induction, are not derived from nature so they cannot be **objective**, on the contrary they are controversial. According to him the thing that is conceptualized “is not to be found in sense experience, since *extend* of the concept is far wider than extend of the experienced facts” (Brennan 145-146). Almost for the same reason Bergson claims what has not happened yet cannot be predictable or the basis of prediction does not lie in **laws of nature**. Bergson explains this by asserting “[...] the past is preserved by itself, automatically” (CE 6-5). The importance of this approach lies in the criticism of enlightenment as one of the cornerstones. Philosophical approach of David Hume is taken by Bergson (and also by Gilles Deleuze) as a point that could break deterministic ideas and Kantian category of causality to show that cause-effect relationship cannot be derived from nature or from any other relationship other than memory which connotes a habitual derivation not a scientific law.

In addition to those ideals concerning duration we should also consider that although past unfolds itself into present and future, and endures in memory, this unfolding is not a single one, that is to say that, there is not a single duration. When Bergson speaks of duration he also emphasizes the multiplicity of durations. Besides our own duration, there is the duration of objects, and other material entities. To be more precise, we can speak of the plurality, the abundance of durations of everything. That

are all coincides with one another and the duration of, let's say, the universe. It is almost clear for everyone to speak of a duration of the egos, that is, human duration⁹.

To assert such a thesis, however, does not mean that duration is totally subjective. In

Creative Evolution Bergson declares that:

If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy nilly, wait until the sugar melts¹⁰. This little fact is big with meaning. For here the time I have to wait is not that mathematical time which would apply equally well to the entire history of material world, even if that history were spread out instantaneously in space. It coincides with my impatience, that is to say, with a certain portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer something *thought*, it is something *lived*. It is no longer a relation, it is an absolute (9-10).

Matter also has its own duration independent of ours since whatever we do we have to wait until the sugar melts. We could count the durations differentiated in quoted paragraph as our duration¹¹ that is more or less psychological, and the duration of the melting sugar –even if we could influence the process by accelerating other durations that those two durations coincides with. Therefore, it is almost impossible to differentiate durations, classify them or measure them with a general rule¹².

Although Bergson puts forward such a definition of duration in terms of flow, change, multiplicity and singularity¹³ that excludes the means of measurement, Bergson admits that, the isolation system of science to measure time is not completely artificial. Matter that is measured, calculated has the tendency to support

⁹ As Virilio puts it “anyone would live a duration which would be his own and no one else’s” (Virilio, 22)

¹⁰ Due to the duration that is necessary for sugar to melt sugar’s duration has its own limits even if melting process can be accelerated by stirring, the duration needed has to pass independent of human psychology (My footnote).

¹¹ Bergson’s ideas on human duration give inspiration to existentialist thinkers since Bergsonian philosophy gives the possibility to evaluate human not with his/her actions in past. Duration of things embraces them as whole and questions it as a whole which provides not to consider human beings before the finalization of their duration. In this respect he opens the path to ‘free will’. Therefore it is not surprising that his book is called *Time and Free Will*.

¹² In this respect, the history cannot be a ‘science’ that has the claim of defining the past since there are plenty of pasts.

the rules and laws of the system. **Objectivity** of science arises from this tendency. However, this tendency is valid to some extent. It is not a totally and strictly closed system since matter is not a completed, concrete thing that excludes change and mobility. This could be accepted as a reason of the modifications, revolutions, and transformations of scientific laws. Regarding this, although science deals with matter with the possibility of measuring, it fails to give the absolute. Duration is that absolute.

Although universe shows a tendency toward measurement, as it is mentioned above, it changes without ceasing. In this respect it is open. Bergson clarifies it by attributing universe two opposite movements that are descending and ascending. Descending unfolds the “ready prepared”, that provides, for example, periodical occurrences. “But the ascending movement, which corresponds to an inner work of ripening or creating, *endures* essentially, and imposes its rhythm on the first, which is inseparable from it.” (CE 11).

Those dilemmas and problems, mentioned hitherto, arise as a result of the difference between time and duration, which indicates turning back to the first chapter of this thesis and calling to mind the epistemological difference that differentiates knowing things from within and without. The problem of time and duration has the same methodological solution which suggests examining time with intuition. Bergson concludes that

It grasps a succession which is not juxtaposition, a growth from within, the uninterrupted prolongation of the past into a present which is already blending into the future. It is the direct vision of the mind by the mind – nothing intervening, no refraction through the prism, one of whose facets is space and another, language (CM 32).

¹³ ‘Singularity’ when we speak of the duration of the universe that all durations melts into.

2.3.1. Change – Evolutionism – Creativity

We have examined Henri-Louis Bergson's basic philosophical notions like intuition and duration, and showed the turning points of his philosophy from his predecessors. As we examined, one of the main Bergsonian criticism is against the mathematical, mechanical understanding of the world. He draws his understanding accordingly and shows us that the problems arise as a result of this approach. One of the main misunderstandings created by this approach is the exclusion of change and becoming, which, according to Bergson, are the very nature of the real. He shows us that the mechanical, Cartesian understanding of time and motion also excludes becoming, and emphasizes that becoming and flux are parts of reality. In *Creative Mind* Bergson puts forward the importance of change in [his] philosophy "[...] for a philosophy resembles an organism rather than an assemblage, and it is still better to speak of evolution in this case than of composition..." (111)

In Bergsonian philosophical approach, change covers an important place since, according to Bergson, everything changes without ceasing and change is not a subjective phenomena. In other words, there is nothing but change; there is only a state which is to change (Bergson, CE 2).

It is generally considered that, especially the living beings are subject to becoming and change. However, as Bergson puts it "matter or mind, reality has appeared to us as a perpetual becoming. It makes itself or it unmakes itself, but it is never something made" (CE 272).

Change is an inescapable reality. Change is the nature of all beings living or material and it has a kind of eternity since, as long as things exist, change exists. Although living bodies like human body that passes from one state to another express this

change more, material objects have the same destiny. This assertion shows that not only living beings but also objects change. To make a stress on this issue connotes a feature of science which is to hold object or subject matter as a concrete and complete thing. In contrast to this scientific model, Bergsonian understanding, as it is mentioned earlier, puts change and evolution, or to put it right, becoming in the center of philosophy. Bergson asserts that everything has its own duration, and every motion has authenticity, singularity independent of spatiality, and creativity of becoming shapes the world. The *speculations* on *nature* have practical ends, and as a result of those practical mechanisms, we become unaware of the true nature whose essence is becoming, change or evolution. Duration and becoming have another nature than we think and speculate on it (CE 273).

The idea of change is directly related with the definition of duration in Bergson's works. Time and duration are the basic examples of inescapable change. The basic ancient assertion on the flowing river in which nothing gets into twice is an illustrative example. It is not surprising that duration, according to Bergson, is a flow which is irreversible and projects itself into future by the work of our memory.

"Disengaged from its subordination to spatiality and the representation of objects in space, time is the form of change" (Olkowski 106). The relation between change and duration is a mutual relation. The understanding of duration also leaves space for the possibility of change since, duration is not a completed thing. As we mentioned earlier, there are several durations overlapping with one another since duration of me is different from the duration of melting sugar in a cup of tea which ought not to be understood as a theory based on mere psychology and subjectivism.

Change is also a key concept for creativity, and hence novelty. Since our memory prevents us living the same state twice, human personality changes every instant and

accumulates experiences. Due to the existence of past in our memory our **duration is irreversible**. In addition to these, Bergson insists that change brings novelty to life and gives rise to creativity since, for example, human acts cannot be predictable as genuine works of art. The difference of material objects and living beings lies, at that point, in the difference in kind and difference in degree where the difference in kind duration and qualitative change and difference in degree represents space and quantitative features. Therefore, the analogy between work of art and human being is an analogy that represents the creative, quantitative change in both, and of course, this analogy is possible with not repeating the same state twice “for to predict it would have been to produce it before it was produced” which may mean equality and similarity, and even sameness¹⁴ (Bergson, CE 5-6).

The understanding of time that Bergson opposes resulted in a kind of determinism in which things and events are determined, and are predictable. Free activity is condemned in this picture. On the contrary, Bergson leaves a space for creativity and free activity which is evident just by the name of his work *Time and Free Will*. Determinism defines the subject by some states “[t]he truth, however, is that the self is not determined by these states, it *is* these states.” (Linstead and Mullarkey 6).

Instead of being shaped by determinism, having the power of choosing brings a creative element into human life. As it is mentioned earlier, it is not surprising that, those ideals make it possible Bergson to consider as a predecessor of existentialism that brings forth human being as an artistic creature in making his/her own life¹⁵.

Material objects also change with a considerable difference arisen from the aforementioned features of living beings that carry the feature of creativity. “Thus

¹⁴ We will investigate in detail the Bergsonian approach in arts later in this thesis.

¹⁵ It is evident that Bergson returns freedom to human being in the age of world wars.

nothing is created therein, neither form or matter. What the group will be is already present in what it is, provided “what it is” includes all the points of the universe with which it is related.” (Bergson, CE 8). Bergson stresses that, even by the displacement of the smallest particles, matter become a target of change.

One of the most important influences of Bergson concerning his ideas on change is *evolutionism*. He was born in the year that *Origin of Species* was published and he was familiar with those understandings of evolutionism. Instead of following Darwinian evolutionism or any other sort of idea of evolution, he introduces *élan vital* as a sort of life force. Life itself is a creative evolution by being a vital order as Bergson puts it in *Creative Evolution* (224). He depicts a process of constant change and development, irreversible and unrepeatable. Therefore, as it is mentioned, biology cannot be old as physics. By asserting this difference, Bergson opposes mechanical approaches toward evolution that is depended on the material articulation which puts a sort of determinism toward future appearances of species as well as past images of them. In contrast, the organization of future is a creative process that excludes exact verification of predictions. Evolution has no goal. It cannot draw a “life in general”, and there is no strict rule for it. It could happen by minute or sudden changes. Evolution and change, hence, indicates the philosophy of **becoming** an idea which affects some philosophers like Heidegger.

As it is emphasized, directly related with his ideas on change and becoming Bergson puts forward another key concept which is *élan vital*, that is, the vitality of living beings that cannot be found in geometrical, spatial things that are lifeless. *Élan vital* is a sort of force that uses effort to overcome the resistance of matter and it is analogous with creativity, the organized form of the world and open to change, even provides change. *Élan vital* is directly related with intuition, nature, creativity and

duration. It is the order of living bodies. It is natural since it is the relation with real and it is within reality. On the contrary, the order of spatiality is more complex that breaks the whole into parts which are artificial, homogeneous units (Lorand 402). The vital force is the indicator of possibility in Bergsonian sense. As it is mentioned before, possibility is the thing that has not happen hitherto. In this sense it does not turn its face to past, rather it is related with the future. The importance of this differentiation of real and possible lies at the bottom of creativity. Since possibility is a projectile to future that connotes the creativity which is to change those possibilities through real. This definition hinders the entrance of a kind of preformism that leaves space to creativity. *Élan vital*, in this sense, is the process of production, or creation of life.

2.4. Movement

As we mentioned in the introduction and in the chapter concerning epistemological approach of Henri Bergson, movement is another cornerstone for this study. It is clear, until now, that Bergson criticizes the Cartesian understanding of movement that is composed of partial points and that falls into the subjective kind of knowledge. This false problematization of movement brings us to an illusory state that lead us to think movement as the juxtaposition and continuity of those poses. In so far as movement is composed of those poses, an element that provides continuity is needed. To provide this continuity, philosophers generally apply to some transcendental mediums like Descartes who, as we mentioned, consults the idea of God who carries out the intervals between poses and ensures the continuity of movement. Bergson goes back to Zeno paradoxes to explain this false understanding of motion.

Bergson's emphasis on movement is analogous with the emphasis made on duration. Since, the false problematization of both elements are based on the sort of false problems that consider one element related with other and apply the rules of one to the other. Very similar to his understanding of duration which has been considered in this dissertation, movement must also be considered as a whole like the understanding of duration. In analogy with duration, when movement is considered with spatial measurements, it creates a mechanistic illusion. If it is considered with stops "it is no longer a single movement." (Bergson, CE 309). This understanding illustrated in filmic terms shot and frame. To create movement out of poses or stops there should be something, an additional property, that must be added to organize motion like Descartes does. The combining property usually addressed is mind or reason. In *Matter and Memory* Bergson highlights the idea of movement as such: "The movements of matter are very clear, regarded as images, and that there is no need to look in movement for anything more than what we see in it" (Bergson, MM 23). There is therefore nothing needed to consider movement other than itself.

Bergson clarifies that

...there are two elements distinguished in motion, the space traversed and the act by which we traverse it, successive positions and the synthesis of these positions. The first of these elements is a homogeneous quantity: the second has no reality except in a consciousness: it is a quality or an intensity, whichever you prefer (Bergson, TFW 112).

As it is mentioned above, the problem concerning motion arises due to the consideration of movement in terms of space. Bergson emphasizes that although space is divisible, and hence, measurable movement, the act of motion, on the contrary, cannot be a matter of that kind of a measurement and division. According to him, Zeno paradox plays its role in this misunderstanding of movement. Even if divisibility is applicable to space, movement cannot be considered in term of it since,

movement is in the plane of act and different from the space it traverses. As mentioned above, the relation between space and movement is this mutual traversing: the space traversed and the act of traversing. Paradoxes of Eleatics arise from the confusion of these two points. On the one hand we have divisible space and on the other indivisible motion.

This problem of confusing time and duration, and movement and motion are the problem in the province of science since, science cannot do without excluding duration and motion. As Bergson puts: "Science has to eliminate duration from time and mobility from motion before it can deal with them" (Bergson, TFW 115). When science measures time or velocity of a movement it, in fact, measures space, which, according to Bergson, is the thing that is measurable. As a result science does not deal with duration and movement but deals with space and simultaneities. In *Time and Free Will* he suggests that

...duration and motion are mental syntheses, and not objects; that, although the moving body occupies, one after the other, points on a line; and finally that, although the position occupied by the moving body vary with the different moments of duration, though it even creates distinct moments by the mere fact of occupying different positions, duration properly so called has no moments which are identical or external to one another, being essentially heterogeneous, continuous, and with no analogy to number (120).

The problem of motion is also directly related with the work of intelligence. As we discussed earlier, the work of our intellect is akin to produce mobility from immobilities in juxtaposition. As Bergson puts intuition as a method, he also supposes that intuition starts immediately from the motion itself and considers immobilities as abstractions and snapshots of mobility taken by our minds (CM 34). When understood from this point of view, movement cannot be separated from duration and change since, it includes both elements. For example, the motion of an

arm has an integrity and its movement also illustrates a duration of the move. We should note that the movement is closer to living beings that has the power to move by themselves and not by the effect of any other thing other than their instinctual moves or conscious acts, which is easier to understand in terms of *élan vital* that, as it is mentioned, has the capacity to force the limits of matter, and in this respect holds movement as the agent and the source. Movement, therefore, does not need to be carried on by something else, or there is no need to search for the ‘unmoved mover’.

2.5. Matter and Memory

Besides his striking ideas on intuition, duration and motion, Bergson opens new horizons on the duality of matter and mind, materiality and spirituality. As it could be observed from his philosophical terminology, Bergson states dualisms and he understands things in dual positions, from the side of the matter and spirit. However, by spirit he does not define a transcendental or mystic equivalent, which would mean to return to traditional metaphysics. This dualism is examined in his monumental work *Matter and Memory* (1896), by which he attracted great attention.

Matter and Memory is a very striking work since it differentiates matter in a different way from its previous definitions. The book starts with a claim that everything is an image and the universe is the aggregate of images. To claim this, means to define the matter as image and, according to Bergson, every material entity is image. This is very important since, it is grounded on perception and defines matter as image. However, one of the most remarkable novelties that he brings is to claim that “brain is an image” among other images, that is to say that brain is a material entity. This definition can be considered as a first step toward a more general and wider system since, he saves the brain from being something more than matter, and therefore, left

behind the philosophies that give importance to the work of the brain that is capable of organizing the phenomena. This gives rise to another statement which clarifies Bergson's approach toward matter; "the brain is part of the material world; the material world is not part of the brain" (MM 19).

To assert that brain is an image and a part of material world is to accept the existence of material world and its being images which is in one respect a phenomenological way of philosophizing. Based on perception, Bergson works with the perceivable phenomena and systematizes his philosophy accordingly. Hence, he left the transcendental philosophizing outside of his ideas. He also does the same for human body that he also defines as an image and a part of the material world. As a result, neither the brain nor the body has any privilege among other images. This approach provides that the body or the brain is not the center of phenomena, they cannot produce material object by themselves since, they are among those material objects. Body as the agent of movement effects and is being affected by other images, transmits movement and can move other objects, "is, then, a center of action; it cannot give birth to representation" (Bergson, MM 20). The brain and the body are only the transmitters of images including our own material image which is also to claim that the material existence does not depend on our existence. Even if it is not perceived, there is matter there. In this respect, "presence and representation, seems just to measure the interval between matter itself and our conscious perception of matter" (Bergson, MM 35).

In this respect perception become an important element that gives us the matter. However, we have to notice that the perception of the matter does not give us the matter itself, or more than what matter has, instead it is a process of concealing. As Bergson noticed:

[...] it would be necessary, not to throw more light on the object, but, on the contrary, to obscure some of its aspects, to diminish it by the greater part of itself, so that the remainder, instead of being encased in its surroundings as a *thing*, should detach itself from them as a *picture*. Now, if living beings are, within the universe, just “centers of indetermination,” and if the degree of this indetermination is measured by the number and rank of their functions, we can conceive that their mere presence is equivalent to the suppression of all those parts of objects in which their functions find no interest (Bergson, MM 36).

Perception then conceals some properties of matter due to our interests concerning them and its very own nature that prevents understanding matter in its integrity.

Perception does not give direct access to matter or organize relationship of the material world. Therefore, to claim that the process of perception is a sort of concealing is not just saying that the perception eludes some properties of the matter, but is also a criticism of Kantian philosophy in which categories of mind add relations to matter.

Regarding assumptions mentioned above, Bergsonian claim on perception is something negative since, it cannot give the whole as well as adds nothing new to matter. Therefore perception is more close to obscurity, and limited to the interests of the perceiver since we have the tendency of perceiving the interested parts of the image so it cannot provide a complete image. It is not surprising that Bergson and Bergsonian philosophers refer very often to Leibnizean understanding of monads each of which evaluate the whole even though we do not perceive the minute units of perception which is achieved by intuition in Bergson’s philosophy.

Bergson follows a logical order to reach what he wants to indicate in a clear manner. After defining the role of brain and body, he clarifies the role of our senses that provides perception. He asserts that our senses need education in order to “localize impressions”. Impressions by the education of senses become to be united in groups and sets in order to be utilized in right time and place that, in a way, always hinders

encountering the new. However, this does not mean that senses have extra faculties to organize impressions. This is another reason of our not constructing the whole out of perception and impressions. Bergson defines an interval that separates the diverse perception of the **same** object. So, the gaps between perceptions, arises as a need to separate them. What he wants to mean by education lies at the roots of this condition, in which education arises as a tool of harmonizing senses with each other to restore a continuity that is broken by our needs.

Bergson states another element to distinguish perception and affection in order to prevent us from misunderstandings and confusions that could appear. He states that

[...] our perception of an object distinct from our body, separated from our body by an interval, never express anything but a *virtual* action. But the more distance decreases between this object and our body (the more, in other words, the danger becomes urgent or to promise immediate), the more does virtual action tend to pass into *real* action. Suppose the distance reduced to zero, that is to say that the object to be perceived coincides with our body is the object to be perceived. Then it is specialized perception will express, and this is exactly what affection is (MM 57).

As Bergson shows, affection is not equal to perception. They have differences in kind, and not in degree. Since our body is the office of the perception “there is no perception without affection” bound to the fact that there is at least the body that perceives. In this respect, if one wants to attribute a privilege to body as the aggregate of images, this privilege could only indicate that the body is the agent of the action as well as the office of the affection (MM 57-61).

From there ideas on matter, Bergson proceeds to describe what memory is.

According to him, between perception and memory there is a difference in degree not in kind. Perceptions live in the memory as past and mingle into present and future. The importance of memory stands besides the intuition like a methodological

concept in his works. Although it is not defined as method, the possibility of experience depends on this basic term. Memory is not a function of the brain. As we mentioned, body is a transmitter of the movements to motor mechanisms (Bergson, MM 77).

Memory records everything about lived experience, first without any classification and privilege. This recording endures without ceasing in duration. This process of memory is a sort of accumulation of the past and lived experience, which afterwards unfolds itself into present and future. Bergson puts it in *Creative Evolution* as such:

My memory is there, which conveys something of the past into present. My mental state, as it advances on the road of time, is continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates: it goes on increasing – rolling upon itself, as a snowball on the snow” (2).

There is no distinct past, present and future. Past is already involved in present and future would include what is called past and present at the moment. It is never repeated. Besides some exceptions resulted from psychological or neurological illnesses, we can never see the same **film** twice.

Almost every detail is included in memory without a level of utility or practice. Although some memory images are more nascent than some others, there is the trace of the trace in memory. It associates the Freudian Mystic Writing-Pad on which traces left and by the help of celluloid paper it is possible to leave new traces by “erasing” the old ones. However, the act of erasing is not a permanent removal. The traces only disappear from the celluloid paper not from the wax layer. So the traces could be found in wax layer, although the cover seems clear. This would be clear when unconscious will be taken into account. “[...] in the Mystic Pad no use is made of the permanent traces of the notes that have been received; it is enough that they are present” (Freud 230). Memory “stores up the past by the mere necessity of its

own nature.” (Bergson, MM 81). Later those perceptions in memory take their places and create an order among them which brings some of perceived images into light and conceals some others. This happens according to inner and outer effects on memory, or in other words, actions give an order to them. Indeed, it is not a mere representation when our memory recollects past, rather it acts on present and future. However we have to stress that Bergson defines two kinds of memories one of which imagines and other repeats. The images of the past recalled, the valuation of the things and events are possible and human memory is capable of dreaming. Although memory also exists in animals, e.g., a dog remembers his master and his directions, names of some objects etc., human memory have those features that makes it different from animal memory that provides human to act on something. In this respect, the work of memory can be defined as an unfolding, that is, memories unfold into present and future.

It is evident that although we perceive everything, memories reveal some that are more useful, more effective and/or more emotional etc. We could, from a psychological perspective, call those kinds of memories consciousness and others repressed and/or that are not used unconsciousness. Habits are produced as a consequence of the most common events, which indicate a kind of repetition¹⁶.

Although second kind of memory that repeats is important, the former has a significant place, and according to Bergson, it is the memory *par excellence* that leaves no space for the accidents that are repeated. By this memory we do not need to repeat things or experience repeated events in order to recall them. Recollection could also happen when a memory is recalled.

¹⁶ Repetition in the sense that nothing can really be repeated. The completely same or identical events do not occur or recur. The habitual classification of the events under same categories are named as repetition. In this respect it is just an abstraction of the intellect.

Of these two memories that we have distinguished, the second, which is active, or motor, will, then, constantly inhibit the first, or at least only accept from it that which can throw light upon and complete in a useful way the present situation ... (Bergson, MM 85).

Even though those two memories are distinguished they work together mutually. As a result, as Bergson sums up, the past exists in two different forms in our memory: first stores the motor events that hold the natural laws, and therefore, works practically without any need to confront images again and again, and the second works more spontaneously independent OF our will. Those two memories are called **pure** by Bergson.

From one respect, memory is a means of representation of previous occurrences and events. However, “the concrete process by which we grasp the past in the present is *recognition*.” (Bergson, MM 90). Recognition, thus, is to exist in present, it brings past to present together. Bergson gives an example to illustrate the work of memory, in which a person goes to a town for the first time, where he/she finds obscure to him/her. After some time spent in the town, the mechanical work of the memory leaves no space to hesitation while going around in the town. Thus, Bergson states a motor order of those movements and in recognition (MM 93). Recognition then provides past living in present, part includes the whole. However, “for, though the whole series of our past images remains present within us, still the representation which is analogous to the present perception has to be *chosen* from among all possible presentations” (MM 95).

Bergson’s distinction between matter and memory, perception and memory give rise to a different philosophical dualism which is materialism and spiritualism, rather than realism and idealism. Because Bergson asserts that between perception of the matter and matter itself there is a difference in degree not of kind. There is more in

the matter than our perception, and not the contrary and matter is not a mysterious entity that conceals itself.

This Bergsonian approach changes the basic problem of metaphysics and paves the way for a new phenomenological and empirical philosophy. His novelty not just effects philosophical discussions in those fields but also in the sphere of philosophy of art there appear new approaches and understandings.

CHAPTER III

BERGSON AND CINEMA

3.1. Bergson and Art

Is not the world a work of art incomparably richer than that of the greatest artist?

Henri Bergson

Although, Henri Bergson mostly is known through the Cinema books of Gilles Deleuze in the sphere of arts, especially in cinema, his philosophy could be considered as an approach to aesthetics. Bergson, in fact, did not present a theory of art, or aesthetics. However, his philosophical concepts are very akin to introduce an artistic theory. Starting from his philosophical concepts and criticism of western philosophy which give rise to his philosophical thoughts, one could shape an aesthetic understanding.

The basic assumption on Bergsonian art theory first arises from his method of philosophizing, that is, intuition. Being a direct experience, intuition is applicable to art that needs this direct experience in its production process and as a finalized work. According to Bergson, pure metaphysical insight and understanding functions in art more effectively than any other means of understanding like language. Art breaks the formal, utilitarian boundaries of symbols which mean to remove the noise (in a way) from communication that gives us the chance to face with real. Romanos, in *On the "Immediacy" of Art*, states that

This is then supposed to account for an urgency, a directness, an immediacy of art, not possessed by language, mere conventionally adopted symbols which allegedly generalize the peculiarly individual features of reality and thereby construct a fictitious world of abstract general characteristics in place of the real one of radically individual concrete experience (73).

As we already mentioned in “Intuition” chapter, Bergson assumes that language distorts reality and hinders intuitive, real experience. On the contrary, art is a direct experience with itself that “can communicate with a more direct vision of reality.”

As we already discussed, the practical needs to cover the reality with a veil and creates illusions about the real. “Through intuition and a “disengaged” vision, the artist can lift this veil and offer us a privileged view of reality”¹⁷ (Totaro, Time, Bergson and the Cinematographic Mechanism, 2). The artistic work, in this sense, does not require any medium other than senses.

Creativity is the basic element of every kind of art from music to poetry. The work of art is creative from two respects. First, the artist is a creative being; second, the work of art is a creative product. This creative process begins from the idea of the work to be produced till its completion and interpretation processes. In this respect, the process of creativity is also a process of becoming since, a work of art is never a complete and concrete object. Even if the concept of the work is clear and distinct for the art-lover, the imagination leaves space for freedom and free interpretation. This process of becoming could be thought in analogy with a living organism.

Thinking through Bergsonian philosophy, we could also claim that the work of art excludes measurement and evaluation as it is thought in terms of intuition¹⁸. It excludes any kind of measurement and therefore cannot be predictable since, to be able to measure something is to foresee the rest of the process. According to

¹⁷ Of course, what is called by reality here is in the realm of arts.

¹⁸ To determine the “value” of the work of art is another social net.

Bergson, as we already stressed, a genuine work of art cannot be predictable or foreseeable since, one has to see or hear it earlier to foresee it. A symphony by Beethoven is therefore, precious and unique. A work of art is, therefore, analogous with creativity and intuitive understanding in Bergsonian terminology.

The work of art is a process of becoming since, it could be considered in terms of duration. “Art expresses *an unpredictable order*” (Lorand, 405). The final product of art, whether it is a film or a painting, is not a realization of an idea. Even if the creator of the work of art has something in mind about the final product, it is obvious that final product is something different from that idea since, a wider frame, or a different touch of the brush make **the thing** different from the plan. The process is a becoming process and it lasts until the work has the final shape, character etc. and even after that process. “The idea of the work and its material qualities are inseparable; they are bound to change along with the process of creation because time is real and therefore affective” (Lorand 405).

The effects of Bergsonian philosophy can also be observed in literature. His ideas on duration, change, and memory affected some writers among whom Marcel Proust has a great importance by describing the change and effect of time over events and memory. Proust seems to want to record the impressions of time, or rather, the time as it passes by in his work *À la recherche du temps perdu*¹⁹. However, the organization of memory shapes the events differently and the most crucial events, feelings or problems of the past become memories that need to be recollected. Therefore, in Proust’s work, time is no longer an objective, progressive and

¹⁹ Giorgio Agamben summarizes this by asserting that humanity tries to catch “what is slipping through its fingers for ever” that is time (Infancy and History, 138).

periodical thing. Rather it is a continuum, an unfolding and an accumulation in which past and present merge into one another²⁰.

In addition to those points derived from Bergsonian philosophy, we could also add that Bergson's understanding of art is against representation since, even he suggests it for perception. As Mullarkey mentions in his book *Bergson and Philosophy*, Bergson's perception is not the representation and thus duplication of reality.

"Bergson sees perception as an action rather than the duplication of reality; likewise, he sees the brain as an action rather than the theatre for observing this duplicate reality [...]" (Mullarkey 44). Mullarkey states:

Bergson's whole argument is that it is just as likely that perception should occur at the object where we perceive it as it is for it to occur at our eye or our brain. In fact, because the perception is of the object, it is more likely *de jure* to occur at the object than anywhere else (47).

In *Of Images and Worlds: Toward a Geology of Cinema* Jean-Clet Martin stresses the idea that supports aforementioned thesis by claiming that "perception is not [...] of the order of representation, nor of reproduction, nor (more simply) of resemblance of an image faithful to a supposedly exterior pattern" (71). In this respect, Bergsonian philosophy does not deal with models and copies of the idea of representation.

This idea that excludes representation provides free space for arts by which they could be freed from the discussions of representation and model-copy. This is also to assert that art has its own terms and even has its own reality.

²⁰ Not only the influence of Bergson can be observed in works of Proust but also a Turkish writer Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar take the time as a basic problem of his work *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü* in which the artificiality of time told in a witty manner. In this work time is mocked by being a matter of measurement, and by being a means of organizing life.

3.2. Cinema

For a long time cinema was not considered as a form of artistic struggle. It is said to be just the record of reality and, it was claimed that, this recording process has nothing to do with creativity. It was a claim that follows the same debates on photography. Both photography and cinema were technological developments and brought new horizons to the discussions on arts. Photography mechanically achieves what painters try to achieve in their works, which is representing the reality²¹. As we will mention later, cinema presents a more powerful kind of representation that includes movement and time. This feature of cinema is important for our subject in this dissertation since the presentation of movement and time in cinema is not just debatable in the realm of arts, but, as we will see, it is also important philosophically.

Before the appearance of cinema the movement and time was tried to be represented in almost all branches of arts. Especially visual arts were more akin to deal with this problem of representation. However, this effort of depicting time and movement could be efficient enough when mediums such as painting and sculpture are considered. Because of the immobility and stability of the nature of those arts, time and movement can only be represented as phases. As McClain quotes from *The Laocoön and Other Prose Writings of Lessing*²² “[A painter] can only make use of a *single moment* in the course of an action, and must therefore choose the one which is the most suggestive and which serves most clearly to explain what has preceded and follows” (42).

²¹ We should be careful about not going to far with this assumption since no all painters has the same aim, rather we mention the situaiton as a complex of reaching reality, not defining the nature of painting.

²² ed. W.B. Ronnfeldt, London, 90f

Since becoming and change are the true nature of reality, it is difficult to depict that reality by illustrating a single instant. The representation of reality, hence, is only possible with the capture of the moment by memory which is also problematic when recollection is considered²³. Therefore, arts could only be capable of representing the tendency toward movement and phases of time. The phases of a hand moving indicates different actions like writing, dancing or reaching out to hold something etc., or the rising sun illustrates the early moments of the morning, or moon and stars show that the present of the scene is night. The missing scenes in those images are completed by mind and memory so that the scene is held within a relative continuity. It could be claimed that, arts before cinema, therefore, works with an incompleteness, that is, movement and time can never be completed in a single frame or without introducing a *deus ex machina*.

Since arts always fail to represent the scenes seen by eyes, artists use some mediums to facilitate their work. In medieval times and afterwards, *camera obscura* is used to reflect the images to walls or some similar surfaces; it is used by some painters in painting while image is reflected on a surface. Those mediums vary though the struggle of giving more data about the everyday life like shadow puppet that is able to combine sound, movement and image in a single event. At the beginning of 19th century, some kinds of **toys** such as Phenakistoscope and Zoetrope create the illusion of movement by rotating image-machines. One of the most considerable developments was made by Edward Muybridge, who captures the movement of a horse by recording it with several cameras and projecting it. Although the movement is created by the images of different instants which are relatively distant to each other, the work of the eye and brain which provides to fill the gaps between those

²³ Recollection in this sense is not the representation of the experienced event.

instants was helpful. In late 1800s, the stable image turned out to be a movement image by the inventions of Thomas Edison and his assistant Dickson, and Lumière Brothers. In 1885, the first film is shot that is called the *Workers Leaving the Lumière Factory at Lyon (La Sortie de l'usine Lumière a Lyon)* screened publicly in Paris (<http://www.earlycinema.com/timeline>). André Bazin puts:

The decisive moment undoubtedly came with the discovery of the first scientific and already, in a sense, mechanical system of reproduction, namely perspective: the camera obscura of Da Vinci foreshadowed the camera of Niepce. The artist was now in a position to create the illusion of three-dimensional space within which things appeared to exist as our eyes in reality see them (11).

The development of cameras and projectors continues in parallel development to technology. The invention of cinema therefore brings technology and art together in twentieth century from silent cinema to talking films, from black and white images to color TV's. Those developments in cinema make different things possible. The farthest parts of the world come into movie theatres. People can be recorded and projected even after their death. The cinema industry thereby stamps last century in all areas.

Although, it became usual to see technological images in contemporary times, the first years of cinema was quite shocking. Cinema was a breaking point with respect to the production of time and movement that can only be observed in real life. This was capable of bringing a new psychological status to human life departing from either *memento mori*'s (photographs of dead person) or photographs of living persons since, cinema provides more data about world, like sound (not in first years) and movement, time, and details about the object by close ups etc. Although theatre could give a similar effect by using several theatrical tricks, identification problem hinders the audience from being a part of the scene. Cinema, in a way, overcomes

that effect by leaving the spectator in a dark room seeing **moving pictures** in front of them. The persons, places are not the ones that theatre, for example, presents since they are, in fact, only two dimensional images. We should mention that cinema also separates the carrier of the movement from the moving object. It is not the agent any more but celluloid pictures, or in other words moving images²⁴.

In fact, as Bazin indicates in *The Ontology of the Photographic Image* photography and cinema are freed arts from their “mummy complex”. As a result, according to Bazin, photography is the most important event of the history of plastic arts. “It has freed Western painting, once and for all, from its obsession with realism and allowed it to recover its aesthetic autonomy” (16). While photography gives liberation to plastic arts, cinema mummified duration and movement and creates a more deep and striking change in psychology. In *Time, Bergson, and the Cinematographical Mechanism*, Totaro claims that:

A still photograph spatializes time by freezing the present; a photograph becomes what is impossible in reality: the present as a razor’s edge. Cinema is based on photography but completes the process by returning movement into image. On the screen objects move, people move, and the image (camera) moves (6).

However, cinema brought new debates in history of arts and, as it would be claimed, in the history of philosophy. One of the main problems that will be taken into account is the (re)production of movement and time in cinema since in cinema one second is created by twenty-four successive images. This cinematographic mechanism uses the gaps of perception and creates illusion of continuity between frames. Henri Bergson saw the importance of that mechanism which is a good example to clarify his approach on mechanical movement. This philosophical consideration was on the one hand; on the other hand cinematographic power of

²⁴ Images of the dead person are good examples of what is meant.

effecting masses is recognized and a debate became to appear on it. There appeared genres and manners accordingly. The distinction between Hollywood and Russian/European cinemas came out in the first half of the twentieth century. As it is well known Hollywood was and still is at the side of entertainment and/or film industry and Russian and European cinemas are in politics and thought. However, these are not only concerns related with film sphere²⁵.

3.3. Cinema and Bergsonian approach

As it is mentioned above, cinema creates movement and time with juxtaposed frames that are projected in an accurate speed in which frames cannot be differentiated by perception. This illusory feature of cinema brought new debates in the realm of art and philosophy. As we investigated in Bergson's philosophical approach, the composition of movement and time with poses, or in other words, stops is very controversial and is a result of intellectualization. The understanding of reaching whole through the parts, or creating a line out of points is the underlying reason of debates. Especially in modern world, in 20th century, the dilemmas of time and movement became more important than that has ever been due to the technological developments and representations based on them. The modern, industrialized world works with different appearances of time and movement which are best exemplified in cinema. The mechanistic structure of cinema gives us the **reproduction** of time and movement by constructing them with juxtaposed frames. In this respect, cinematographic work can be considered as a proof for the mechanistic understanding of time and movement composed of equations.

²⁵ Since we are dealing with cinema through philosophy we do not give a full account of the debates in the realm of cinema which could be the subject matter of another dissertation.

Being contemporary with the birth of cinema, Henri Bergson was the first philosopher who attracts attention to this new field. Although he lived until new developments in cinema had occurred, such as depth of field in *Citizen Kane*, he held the cinema by its mechanistic work. Bergson criticizes cinema that makes a stress on subjective understanding of the reality which gives way to false problems as it is examined in the case of Zeno paradoxes. According to him, cinema supports the Cartesian understanding, which by putting images in a succession and by creating the effect of reality creates an illusion. In the beginning of twentieth century Henri Bergson draws the attention to cinema by devoting a chapter on cinematographic mechanism of the mind in *Creative Evolution* which is called *The Cinematographic Mechanism of Thought and the Mechanistic Illusion*. Although he does not take cinema as the subject matter of this chapter he brought cinema in philosophical discourse. He puts that cinematographic mechanism is the reproduction of the understanding that creates an illusion of time and movement. As Totaro indicates “His use of cinema was relatively inconsequential, merely a clever and topical analogy to demonstrate the method by which the intellect grasps knowledge of reality” (Time, Bergson, and the Cinematographical Mechanism, 1). Bergson puts this in *Cinematographic Mechanism* as follows:

Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a becoming, abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself. Perception, intellection, language so proceed in general. Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinematograph inside us. We may therefore sum up what we have been saying in the conclusion that the *mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind* (306).

As it has already explained in “Epistemology” chapter of this dissertation, Bergson stresses that to know things from outside, to place ourselves outside the things, to consider them mechanistically hinders our understanding of the real nature of things that could be comprehended within. Cinema basically uses this mechanistic method in order to create cinematographic image. Hence, cinematographic mechanism, according to Bergson, re-creates the illusion that our mind puts forward for the sake of practicality which provides to overcome the difficulties of the real. What Bergson criticizes in cinema is fundamentally this mechanical work, which creates one-second image out of twenty-four successive frames. This illusion, as it is indicated in Zeno paradoxes, creates the misunderstanding concerning the reality of motion and duration.

Although Bergson uses the term **cinematographical**, he does not develop a philosophy of cinema. By criticizing cinematographic mechanism, Bergson only illustrates the fabrication of the intellect to support his ideas on space-based time and movement. From this point, we could conclude that the aim of Bergson was not try to draw attention to cinema, but just its mechanical work which is a good example for showing the work of the human intellect. Regarding this, Bergson, by putting cinematographic illusion, does not refer to the ontology of cinema or moving images, neither he does consider the artistic **value** of it.²⁶ Therefore, this critique remains right to some extent if Bergson’s aim is accepted. If Bergson’s emphasis on painting and other arts is considered, it could be claimed that cinema cannot communicate reality, and hence, has a secondary place in Bergsonian philosophy.

²⁶ To be more precise, as we stressed, he makes an emphasis on the mechanistic process. What Bergson takes into account in this mechanism has already changed a lot through the development of technology. Images can become to be produced not just by still frames but also by digital numerical data etc.

The main dilemma appears in the problem of mechanical representation of the world. In the first years of cinema, it was almost unavoidable to resist the Bergsonian argument since the main aim of recording images is to reproduce what is seen by eyes and the psychological fascination of people leaves little space to creativity. However, this did not last long. When the power and possibilities of montage is discovered, framing and de-framing and other possibilities of filming became important, cinema began to make something different from the mere and mechanical representation of the world.

The approach aforementioned makes Bergson right in his claim on the mechanical work of cinema. However, if we consider cinema from the point of view that Bergson suggests to solve the discussion or problem between science and metaphysics, we could better analyze the problem that lies in holding Bergson's argument on the illusion taken into account. Regarding this, Bergson puts the one side of his dualism on cinema. However, he does not consider the other side, which is achieved by intuition and considered in terms of duration. Cinema, on the one hand, is the work of the camera and projector that projects recorded images at a certain speed and creates movement and time on the screen many times. Celluloid film in this respect, analogous with Zeno's space-based movement. However, we should ask how much Bergson is right in condemning cinema as he criticizes the thinkers who hold time and motion in analogy with the line replaced on it? In this respect, one has to accept to support this idea that cinematographic work is equal with the work of celluloid 'line' and projector. Nevertheless, cinema is a durational process from which mechanical work cannot be separated and considered as a distinct element. This very Bergsonian understanding, then, turns cinema out to be an intuitively grasped, durational art. Totaro emphasizes this: "To think of film as a

series of individual static frames is no different than thinking of a Bach concerto as a series notes strung together” (Time, Bergson, and the Cinematographical Mechanism 6). In this respect, and from the very Bergsonian point of view, cinema is not the totality of images juxtaposed.

Another point to be considered related with Bergsonian duration in cinema illustrates the basic relations between past, present and future. Totaro suggests that:

Bergson’s definition of duration as the present pregnant with past has no better analogy than the cinema. On its own a film frame is relatively meaningless beyond its mere denotative content, but as they flow through the projector gate they come alive” (Time, Bergson, and the Cinematographical Mechanism 6).

He is right by claiming that there is no pure present in cinema. If there is an illusion, this illusion lies in this character of it. In this respect, cinema is like a magician’s wand that puts a spell on time. Cinema’s present never happens in a way, or in other words, what is present in cinema is already past. Cinematographic image, in this respect, is what accumulated not what is juxtaposed. As Totaro points out, a symphony is not the juxtaposition of notes and tones but a different reality. Why not to apply the same rule to cinema?

However, independent of the age under consideration, whatever the dynamics of cinema in that age, we should admit that cinema is not a mere means of reproduction, representation and camera is not just a recording machine. The complexity of cinema in its entire production process puts it into a realm of multiplicity composed of time, movement, frames, montage etc. When this multiplicity is considered from its fragments, that is, if we hold individual elements of cinema, it is unavoidable, as Bergson would also admit, to create an illusion and misunderstanding about it. In this respect, the mechanical side of the cinematographical mechanism has never been

enough to consider it as a whole. Like our intellectual fabrications, cinema in practice uses the method of our intellect that abstracts and generalizes which is in reality singularity and a whole when considered with intuition.

CHAPTER IV

GILLES DELEUZE

4.1. Bergsonism in the Realm of Cinema

Bergsonian novelty has been noticed by many philosophers and thinkers including famous contemporary French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. His works *Bergsonism* and *Cinema I: The Movement Image* and *Cinema II: The Time Image* are directly related with Bergson and his ideas. Besides those books Deleuze, widely known as Bergsonian, usually refers to Bergson in his studies. However, as we mentioned earlier, the effects of cinema books are quite amazing since while examining cinema, he presents a philosophical point of view on cinematographic elements. In this respect, it is hard to read cinema books that are full of filmic and philosophical references. This new approach brings a new terminology to both fields which is called **film-philosophy** a relatively new area since *Movement-Image* and *Time-Image* were published in 1983 and 1985 in France and their translation into English took a couple of years.

The reason why Deleuze turns his face to cinema is basically the cinematographic elements of time and movement which are also very disputable in the history of philosophy. In cinema books Deleuze exhibits his ideas basically on time and movement. However, to understand why the books are called *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image*, we ought to turn back to Bergsonian philosophy in order to understand the plane that books present and Deleuze uses as a step to philosophy.

As mentioned before, the affect of the title *Cinematographical Mechanism of Thought and the Mechanistic Illusion* creates an interest toward what happened in cinema philosophically. Although, this chapter of *Creative Evolution* is not a philosophical approach toward cinema it is efficient enough to indicate how one could think in terms of cinema. Even though to think through arts is not a new field as aesthetic is an old area, to apply it to cinema widens the horizons of that sphere due to the properties that cinema carries. Deleuze was very aware of the fact that this relatively new art could be very fruitful with respect to those features especially the 're'presentation of time and movement. He begins his new way of looking at cinema with Bergsonian criticism on the work of the intellect that shapes the main issue of *Cinematographical Mechanism*. Deleuze asserts:

In 1907, in *Creative Evolution*, Bergson gives the incorrect formula a name: the cinematographic illusion. Cinema, in fact works with two complementary givens: instantaneous sections which are called images: and a movement or a time which is impersonal, uniform, abstract, invisible, or imperceptible, which is 'in' the apparatus, and 'with' which images are made to pass consecutively (MI 1).

Deleuze continues by asserting that Bergson implants the ancient illusion into a modern phenomenon. Our Bergson examination up to now shows the place of that illusory mechanism of our minds that Bergson opposes in the way to understand the reality. However, Deleuze calls that attempt an incorrect formula and concentrates his studies on Bergson in the realm of cinema on an earlier work, that is, *Matter and Memory*. Instead of examining any other work of Bergson, - especially *Creative Evolution* - Deleuze points out the importance of turning back and investigating *Matter and Memory*, in which, he proposes, Bergson is more akin to understand and describe the work of cinema. As we examined in this dissertation under the same title, the basic thesis of the book is to affirm that matter is composed of images including human body and the universe is composed of images that are related to our

perception. Bergson puts that “*I call matter the aggregate of images, and perception of matter these same images referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my body*”²⁷ (MM 22). This understanding clearly brings an extraordinary approach toward the definition of matter and image. Starting from those ideals presented by Bergson, Deleuze apply the same for the cinema and reaches the definition of movement-image and time-image. As we will investigate this approach changes the direction of cinematographical discourse to time and movement. As Kovács puts it in *The Film History of Thought* “the historical character of his [Deleuze’s] system is determined right from the outset when he sets himself the theoretically novel aim of defining the cinematic image in a way that makes it possible to handle image and movement simultaneously” (154). Regarding this, *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image* not just deal with movement and time but with the concept “image” which appears as a key concept in most of Deleuze’s works.

4.2. Image

Besides movement and time, as aforementioned, Deleuze gives great importance to the idea of **image** that is separated from its familiar definitions by Bergson and derived further by Deleuze. As it is examined, the term image gains a different meaning with philosophy of Bergson, and through him, Deleuzian approach.

However, image becomes something quite unusual in cinema books since, the matter is equalized with image. Time-image and movement-image then indicates material properties. “Objects, qualities, processes, actions, even the brain: all are images in a dynamic universe of images. In this “image-world,” art – specifically, the cinema – emerges as always something not ontologically distinct from the rest of the world” (Schwab 109). Of course, this understanding has some advantages to save cinema

²⁷ Emphasis belongs to Bergson.

such as being a composition of signs and symbols, a semiotic discourse, or a privileged phenomena.

This idea of image cannot be claimed to be totally Bergsonian since, Bergson does not identify movement-image and/or time-image. Instead his definition of duration and motion has their own vigor and dynamism that Deleuze combines, or rather equalizes the terms he takes under consideration. From perception to movement and affection we faced with several material entities. Although it cannot be viewed as traditional ontological philosophies, Deleuze by doing this, it could be claimed, falls into a sort of materialism that excludes Bergsonian project that states a dualism of spiritualism and materialism. However, as Schwab notices “[h]is [Deleuze’s] world of images is neither a special field, nor a particular state of the mind, or a regional ontology” (110).

If we turn back to the difference between Bergson and Deleuze, we could see that what Bergson tries to do is to pull movement and time from their privileged and “artificial” and therefore complex position to the intuitive and simple realm. In this respect, referring to *An Introduction to Metaphysics* in *Creative Mind* it could be claimed that the realm of movement and time are epistemological rather than ontological since, our perception hinders us to reach matter in itself, which, as it is mentioned, obscures rather than enlighten. However, Deleuzian turn illustrates an “[...] ontology of the universe – the universe of images. Being – being itself, without further qualification – is conceived as imagehood; all being is “image-being” and/or “being-image”.” (Schwab, 110)

To define an ontological approach, is therefore not Bergsonian. *Cinema* books, as a result, represent Deleuzian philosophy in its very heart. He sees the gaps in defining

such a term derived from Bergson, and needs to consider three kinds of movement-images, which are, as movement-image, materialized and therefore fill gaps to construct the movement. This line of philosophizing does not lead us to Bergsonian vitalism. Instead, a kind of materialism is put forward that excludes spiritualism that has a great importance as being the element of dualism in order to understand the world²⁸. On the contrary, this line is very ontological and deals with the ontology of movement in cinema. Movement-image and time-image, as it is explained become ontological issues in Deleuze's interpretation of Bergson.

However, Deleuze, by differentiating his own concept of image, does not only fill some sort of "gap" in Bergsonian concepts, but also by relating it to thought, he suggests a new approach. Flaxman explains this in the introduction of *The Brain is the Screen*: "[...] Deleuze clearly aligns the artistic image with the specific capacity to dislodge (deterritorialize) the image of thought, thereby narrowing the definition in order to designate a certain affective and even effective possibility [...]" (12)²⁹. This means that the image is deterritorialized by artistic effort³⁰. Art, then, is not a plain sphere of representation. The deterritorialization of image according to R.W. Cook is:

[...] a process of fictionalization, contiguity and bifurcation, similar to deconstruction, that is characterized by discarding neither/or dialectics and synthesis in favor of 'disjunctive syntheses' using the conjunction 'and' to make connections. Put simply, deterritorialization is a multiplicitous impulse of flight from both dialectical synthesis and

²⁸ To make it clear, Bergsonian spiritualism is not a mystic spiritualism, but a dualism between matter and memory. We, as human beings, at least, have a spiritual part besides material body. In this respect, the term spiritualism could be replaced by vitalism.

²⁹ 'Image of Thought' is one of the issues taken into account in *Difference and Repetition* concerning the very philosophical problems that are defined as 'pre-philosophical' and 'pre-conceptual' which are also considered in *What is Philosophy*. In this respect, what is implied by Image of Thought has direct philosophical content led by 'cogito'. This philosophical connotation has relations with our subject. Since it could be a subject of another thesis we will not dwell on it.

³⁰ Deterritorialization of image is a broad issue that could be the subject of another dissertation. However, to give an idea what Deleuze does by putting forward the term image we will give a short account of deterritorialization.

consolidated aggressions of fight that seek the overthrow of perceived monolithic determinates.

The attempt made by suggesting the concept **deteritorialization** can be rooted to Bergsonian attempt to save reality from representational obstacles like language, which Deleuze does for cinema, or rather as we will see later, for philosophy.

4.2.1. The Movement-Image

Deleuze first writes the *The Movement-Image* instead of first turning his face to *The Time-Image* since, he follows a line that separates movement-image and time-image. As Totaro indicates in Gilles Deleuze's *Bergsonian Film Project*, Deleuze's distinction of cinema books as *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2* coincides with the historical difference before and after World War II. Following the line of *The Movement-Image*, he claims that Deleuze tries to show that before World War II the cinematographic image was movement image, in which mostly movement is emphasized like in the works of Eisenstein, Griffith, Murnau, Lang, Buñuel etc. As it will be examined, this movement image becomes time image after the war.

But the reason is of course not just the change of images from movement to time. It should be pointed out that movement, from the very beginnings of cinema, is very controversial as Bergson also calls attention. Cinema's creating movement by twenty-four frames per second is what makes Bergson to put an analogy between the mechanistic work of mind and cinema. As it is examined and put by Deleuze, according to Bergson "[c]inema thus gives us a false movement – it is the typical example of false movement" (MI 1). Because the work of the cinematographic apparatus creates homogeneous, abstract movement, that is, the movement that is indicated in Zeno paradoxes. As mentioned before, Deleuze rejects this determination and states:

But it has often been noted that what it [cinema] gives us is not the photogramme: it is an intermediate image, to which movement is not appended or added; the movement on the contrary belongs to the intermediate image as intermediate given. It might be said that the position of natural perception is the same. But there the illusion is possible in the corrected 'above' perception by the conditions which make perception possible in the subject. In the cinema, however, it is corrected at the same time as the image appears for a spectator without conditions (MI 2).

Deleuze continues criticizing the approach that is held in *Creative Evolution* and asserts that when movement is claimed to be created out of **instants** or **positions**, there appear privileged instants that are poses. He supposes that modern world does not work with privileged instants any more, instead, there is "any-instant-whatever. Although, movement was still recomposed, *it was no longer recomposed from formal transcendental elements (poses), but from immanent material elements (sections)*". Deleuze stresses that "Instead of producing an intelligible synthesis of movement, a sensible analysis was derived from it" (MI 4). He proposes that the cinematographic apparatus is far away from being just the practical machine for movement image rather it could give movement image "that is, pure movement extracted from bodies or moving things" which is "not an abstraction, but an emancipation" (MI 23). According to him the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* exhibits that

(1) there are not only instantaneous images, that is, immobile sections of movement; (2) there are movement-images which are mobile sections of duration; (3) there are, finally, time-images, duration-images, change-images, relation-images, volume-images which are beyond movement itself... (Deleuze, MI 11)

Although Deleuze, from the very beginning, defines movement-image there remains some gaps in fulfilling the **construction** of the movement. He legitimizes it by defining intervals between movement-images. In *Cinema I*, those intervals are fulfilled by these three kinds of movement-images since, their states are different

with respect to perception, action and affection. Deleuze proposes three “avatars” of movement images:

... [M]ovement-images divide into three sorts of images when they are related to a centre of indetermination as to a special image: perception-images, action-images and affection-images. And each one of us, the special image or the contingent centre, is nothing but an assemblage [agencement] of three images, a consolidate [consolidé] of perception-images, action-images and affection-images (MI 66).

Following Bergsonian definition, Deleuze mentions about perception-image that indicates the perceptual process, “action-image (the narrative process), and affection-image (the expressive process). These three types, which open up to many other (less rigorous) sub-forms (limit-image, matter-images, reason-image, etc.) are found, to varying degrees, in all types of pre-WW2 classical cinema” (Totaro, Gilles Deleuze’s Bergsonian Film Project).

After putting his first commentary on Bergson mentioned from the very beginnings of this section hitherto, Deleuze tries to compose the movement-image by turning Bergsonian frame into shot. As it is also mentioned, he claims that modern world does not work with privileged instants and therefore this modern phenomena, that is cinema, cannot be considered under the terms of ancient paradoxes and approaches toward movement. Shots or frames, or as Deleuze calls it, any-instant-whatevers are not the elements that limit the creativity, to the contrary they become the creative parts in cinema. He proposes that “[t]he shot is the movement-image. In so far as it relates movement to a whole which changes, it is the mobile section of a duration” (MI 22). In this respect, Deleuze could be considered as attempting to save cinema from being mere means of perception. To achieve this aim, he returns to Bergsonian ideas on duration and its relation with change and whole. The movement, in this picture, acts as a substitute for duration. This is, in fact, the missing part of the

Bergson's commentary on cinema since, he stays just with the mechanistic work of cinematographical illusion. As we also suggested in "Cinema and Bergsonian Approach" section, when the other part of the dualism is added to *Cinematographical Mechanism*, the cinematographic work is refigured in the realm of Bergsonian philosophy and the illusion disappears. In fact, by transforming frame into shot, Deleuze turns the cinematographic mechanism into the Bergsonian philosophical approach. By doing that he relates the parts to the whole. As Deleuze expresses "[t]he shot is the movement-image. In so far as it relates movement to a whole which changes, it is the mobile section of a duration" (MI 22).

As any-instant-whatever, Deleuze introduces a similar term to apply it to space which is **any-space-whatever**. To criticize the importance of poses and special spaces Deleuze brings a new term which is any-space-whatever. By doing that he changes the privileged position of space in poses³¹. He suggests that

[a]ny-space-whatever is not an abstract universal, in all times, in all places. It is a perfectly singular space, which has merely lost its homogeneity, that is, the principle of its metric relations or the connection of its own parts, so that the linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways. It is a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible (MI 109).

In the fourth chapter of *Cinema 1* Deleuze examines his *Second Commentary on Bergson*, the subsection of which is called *The Identity of the Image and the*

³¹ Totaro in first part of his paper called *Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project* states that Deleuze takes the term "any-space-whatever" from French anthropologist Pascal Augé who uses this term (any-space-whatever "*l'espace quelconque*") to indicate modern urban spaces such as metro, waiting rooms or airport. Jeffrey a Bell clarifies this by saying that "An 'any space whatsoever' is a space such as a metro stop, a doctor's waiting room, or an airport terminal. It is an anonymous space people pass through, or it is what Deleuze might call a nomadic space, a point of transit between places of 'importance', such as the metro, which is merely the space one passes through between home and work. Moreover, in such spaces -- and this is what interested the anthropologist Augé -- individuals become depersonalized. No one notes or concerns themselves with one another. The place is crowded but everyone is alone. It is for this reason that Augé argued that the 'any space whatsoever' is a homogenous, de-singularizing space" (Thinking With Cinema: Deleuze and Film Theory). According to Totaro, Deleuze transforms this term and makes it its own by disregarding those spaces mentioned by Augé.

Movement. Deleuze begins the section by exploring the relations between phenomenology and cinema and he concludes that phenomenology fails to determine cinematographic mechanism by taking **poses** into account. This phenomenology stays in the first phase of movement described above. Following this line of thought, Deleuze creates an equation between image and movement and asserts, the movement-image among other images that Bergson defines such as brain and body. In this respect, the movement-image, like other images, becomes the subject of actions and reactions. Deleuze argues that one cannot distinguish movement from object in motion. In this respect, there are no coordinates of motion and movement that can be hold accordingly. He asserts, “with cinema, it is the world which becomes its own image, and not an image which becomes the world”. From this point of view, he stresses once more, Bergsonian trial over cinema and gives privilege to Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* in which he thinks, the salvation from Bergsonian false approach that left cinema in the sphere of perception lies. Cinema, regarding this ideal, is a succession of frames that plays with the weakness of perception. However, Deleuze claims that, for Bergson the point should be in the realm of change that he forgot to consider. Deleuze proceeds by asserting that, cinema is “a flowing-matter in which no point of anchorage nor centre of reference would be assignable” (MI 57). This provides to overcome the controversial **nature** of cinema. Deleuze clarifies his ideas by stating that the cinema, on the contrary, has a great advantage:

just because it lacks centre of anchorage and of horizon, the section which it makes would not prevent it from going back up to the path that natural perception comes down. Instead of going from the acentred state of things to centred perception, it could go back up towards the acentred state of things, and get closer to it. Broadly speaking, this would be the opposite of what phenomenology put forward (MI 58).

It could be claimed that this is very Bergsonian element stated as a false problem deriving order (centered) from disorder (acentred). In this respect, Deleuze considers Bergson's philosophical roots from a different perspective, and applies them to cinema. This reversion provides to think movement independent of Cartesian determinations of spatio-temporal coordinates. The root of this differentiation in movement-image, as it could be seen, based on the shot and frame differentiation. Deleuze proposes that shot "continually brings about the transition from one aspect to the other, the apportionment or distribution of the two aspects, their perpetual conversion". He claims that the shot, then, is such a process which "divides and subdivides duration according to the objects which make up the set; reunites objects and sets into a single identical duration". And he continues that shot "continuously divides duration into subdurations which are themselves heterogeneous, and reunites these into a duration which is **immanent**³² to the whole of the universe" (MI 20).

From the idea of movement and time image, Deleuze also introduces space-time "since time of the movement which is at work within it is part of it every time" (MI 59). The Bergsonian point toward such conceptualization should be reminded since, by introducing those terms in Bergson's philosophy, from his own attitude, Deleuze creates a situation that Bergson would criticize. As, for Bergson, introducing new concepts to something felt by the intuition make the nature of the intuitive, absolute knowledge more complex since, those terms introduced need to be explained in some context. Perhaps the reason for Bergson's insistence on not defining what is reached by intuition was this philosophical argument. One of the basic mistakes in the history of philosophy, to repeat it, is to create complex problems that are very simple in nature. Based on those ideals, it could be claimed that Deleuze applies the same to

³² My emphasis.

Bergsonian thought with the claim of making it more clear or easy to understand. In addition to these, he also claims that Bergson's philosophy leads to assert those terms. "The idea of blocs of space-time is therefore *not all contrary* to Bergson's thesis"³³ (MI, footnote 11 226). It could be claimed that to introduce space-time could bring us to a point that both Bergson and Deleuze would avoid of, which is thinking time with space. We should remind that the Bergsonian effort in its core is to save time from space and spatial thinking. The term space-time, although excludes, to some respect, the spatiotemporalization, still calls time with space and vice versa.

Eric Alliez, in *The Brain is the Screen*, suggests that the relationship between Bergson and Deleuze "could be thought of as a chiasmatic structure". In this structure, Bergson insists on non-conceptualization, even if he is in the sphere of conceptual practice, he avoids from going to general, abstract and "*arrested ideas*". This is counterposed and differentiated by Deleuze who places Bergsonian philosophy into conceptualization. According to Alliez, this is a "*second-level*" reading of Bergson "that *systematizes* these themes starting from the concept of a concept, which, *for Deleuze*, stands for that virtual center, that "single point" mentioned by Bergson". It is obvious that in Bergsonian philosophy on the one hand intuition is very simple to understand, however, on the other hand, it is very complex when tried to be conceptualized, that is abstracted, generalized. Bergson asserts in many places, that philosophers, unfortunately, are not able to explain what they feel intuitively. However, it could be suggested that, Deleuze was aware of the fact that Bergson avoids such conceptualization, the translation of intuition to concept. Nevertheless, "what determines this impossible expression is the *incommensurability*

³³ My emphasis.

of the intuition to the concept, as it is given in the present in *attention* and as it speculatively renews itself in *contemplation*” (Alliez 296-7). This attempt cannot be considered just by incommensurability of intuition with concept. Bergson is very much insistent on the issue but is reversed by Deleuze for the sake of contemplation. This approach is what exactly Bergson criticizes in *Philosophical Intuition*, in which philosophers are critiqued by not overcoming the ambition of explaining the intuitive and trying to translate them into conceptualized, abstract forms for the sake of the contemplation.³⁴

4.2.2. The Time-Image

Cinema 2: The Time-Image appeared three years later than *The Movement-Image* published. As it is indicated before, Deleuze explains in the preface of *The Time-Image* that the shift from movement-image to time-image coincides with the post-war period. Deleuze clarifies this shift by asserting that “[...] in Europe, the post-war period has greatly increased the situations which we no longer know how to react to, in spaces which we no longer know how to describe” (xi). This change effects cinema like almost everything and the cinematographic regime transformed from movement to time. Therefore, *The Time-Image* basically deals with the latter part of the shift. Jeffrey A. Bell emphasizes that

The time-image, as Deleuze repeatedly says, [...], results when the cinema, which was centered upon the motion of either the characters or objects presented in the film (or the movement of the camera as 'felt'), breaks down. Deleuze will refer to this as the break of the sensori-motor link. This break, [...] once it occurred it allowed, for the first time, for the presentation of time-images in film (Thinking with Cinema: Deleuze and Film Theory)

³⁴ Of course Bergsonian attempt is very difficult since, as it is mentioned, it seems there is no way to represent the real or to transmit the knowledge of reality. In this respect, a ‘concept’ can be claimed to be necessary. However, we ought not to forget that from Bergsonian approach, the conceptualization of intuitive is to fall into relative. The project concerning the representation of real, considered in this way, in fact is impossible.

Like in the first book of cinema, Bergsonian effect can considerably be observed also in *The Time-Image*. Deleuze agrees on what Bergson defines as *durée* and **whole** which is open to change and has its own duration and becoming that denotes evolution³⁵. To achieve his aim in *The Time-Image*, Deleuze preserves his insistence on *Matter and Memory* and continues his work regarding the ideas raised in that book. Totaro illustrates this by claiming that:

Deleuze spends considerable space discussing memory, especially Henri Bergson's views on memory, because it forms an important part of the second book's central concept: crystal-image (or time-image). In fact, one gets the sense that Deleuze's two books align themselves with the Bergson book that most influenced Deleuze, *Matter and Memory*: movement-image (matter) and time-image (memory) (Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project, Part 2).

It should be noticed that the time of the cinema is quite strange from many respects. To begin with, cinema creates time, as in the case of movement, with immobile sections. This is the mechanical aspect of the production of time. From another aspect, time in cinema, which is **recorded** and screened at a later time whenever wanted, makes the image a past presented in present in which, in a way, pure present, is never possible. Therefore, cinematographic time is very akin to be considered in analogy with some characteristics of duration.

Following this line, Deleuze also uses other Bergsonian terms such as **memory**, **virtual** and **actual**. As we already examined in this thesis, memory prevents us living every single occurrence anew. Due to the work memory, we develop habitual responses to events. Memory, therefore, effects our perception which makes pure

³⁵ It should be reminded that those ideas are not just Bergsonian, a similar line derived from Spinoza, to Nietzsche (which could be claimed as the cornerstones of Bergsonism, since Bergson also refers to those philosophers). However, since we investigate the Bergsonian effect we do not mention about the effects of other philosophers and philosophies due to the fact that those could be the subject of other studies and enlarge the subject of this dissertation.

perception only a theoretical entity because perception without memory is not possible³⁶.

Memory also provides a multidurational aspect to cinematographic image in which various presents coincides. Deleuze notices that “[w]hat is in the present is what the image 'represents', but not the image itself, which . . . is the system of the relationships between its elements, that is, a set of relationships of time from which the variable present only flows” (TI xii). Without the role of memory there would only be one time which is present and nothing else. Regarding these, memory becomes more important in Deleuzian film-philosophy. He suggests that “[m]emory is not in us; it is we who move in a Being-memory, a world-memory” (TI 98). Daniel Frampton studies this by asserting that:

Thus via extrapolation Deleuze argues that in the cinema there are circles, or sheets of past, which coexist between past and present, each sheet having its own characteristics, *accents* (peaks of view), and *aspects* (regions, layers): 'its 'shining points' and its 'dominant' themes' (TI:99), e.g., childhood, death of mother, adolescence, adulthood, illness, etc. Cinema can place us in the past, and then choose one of these sheets (On Deleuze's Cinema).

Although *The Time-Image* does not give an exact definition of what is indicated by the time-image, the main stress is made on **crystal-image** that is used, at the same time, as a metaphor constructed in analogy with crystallization. Totaro suggests that “[i]n the time-image, rational or measurable temporal links between shots, the staple of the movement-image, gives way to "incommensurable," non-rational links.” He claims that those non-rational links derive us to any-space-whatever as a relation between “vacant and disconnected” spaces. “As a consequence, the journey becomes a privileged narrative form, with characters in a more passive role, and themes centered on inner mental imagery, flights of fancy, and emotional and psychic

³⁶ And we could also claim that memory without perception is not possible as well.

breakdown". As a result of this optical and sound image we reach "a direct image of time (a time-image or crystal-image)" (Totaro, Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project, Part 2).

Deleuze puts forward in *The Crystals of Time* chapter of *Cinema 2*

What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time: since the past is constituted not after the present that it was but at the same time, time has to split itself in two at each moment as present and past, which differ from each other in nature, or, what amounts to the same thing, it has to split the present in two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched towards the future while the other falls into the past (81).

Donato Totaro proposes that "[t]he crystal-image, which forms the cornerstone of Deleuze's time-image, is a shot that fuses the pastness of the recorded event with the presentness of its viewing". Therefore, according to him, the crystal-image is a unity that is indivisible into its parts as virtual image and actual image. He supposes that "the virtual image is subjective, in the past, and recollected". In this respect, virtual image exists in the consciousness and "ready to be 'recalled' by an actual image" and the actual image is in the present. "The crystal-image always lives at the limit of an indiscernible actual and virtual image" (Gilles Deleuze's Bergsonian Film Project, Part 2). Frampton states:

Deleuze calls these 'crystal-images' perhaps because their set-up, their internal structure is definite, with its symmetrically arranged faces being those of the actual image and the virtual image becoming one whole inseparable form. This form develops into crystalline narration, of pure optical and sound situations, with sequence takes over from sensory-motor montage, and wherein movement is 'zero' or 'incessant', such that 'the anomalies of movement become the essential point instead of being accidental or contingent' (TI:128). This is part of the scheme of the time-image, *from which* movement derives, which is then *false movement* produced by direct time-images, and thus non-chronological time (movement equals time, false time *therefore* false or abnormal movement) (Frampton).

Regarding those features, the importance of memory becomes clearer since, memory provides the accumulation of perceptions and duration, that are irreversible, and which provides the recollection of past events. It is very similar to the process of crystalization since, a piece of crystal carries the past particles seen through present ones and unites a whole. Bergsonian biologist approach appears here as a key concept since this crystallization process is also very analogous with an organic body that changes, and carries a duration along with itself. At this point, we encounter with duration and change in cinematographic realm. As Kovács notices in his article *The Film History of Thought in The Brain is the Screen*, “the cinema is not entirely ceaseless becoming of movement-images through which the whole would pass as a “history” of images because, at its outset, the cinema bears a strong element of organic evolution” (55).

4.3. Immanence

Although he applies most of Bergsonian terms in his own philosophy, Deleuze draws Bergson a step further and implants his own ideas to consider the phenomena that is claimed to be seen problematic in Bergson. Deleuze’s main attempt in considering cinema is to introduce the plane of immanence into the realm.

His difficulties with the phenomenological conception of both perception and consciousness stem from his theory of the plane of immanence – the infinite set of all images where IMAGE = MOVEMENT. On this plane – the universe as machinic assemblage of movement-images - there exist no privileged positions: everything that appears simply constitutes ‘image’ and acts and reacts on all others (Perkins, Cinephilia and Monstrosity).

According to Deleuze “this infinite set of all images constitutes a kind of plane [plan] of immanence” (MI 58-59). Deleuze nearly dedicates the whole section to this ideal, to the plain of immanence. In this respect, he defines the movement as

immanent to thing in-itself, and asserts that motion should be considered with this plane. As a result, Deleuzian method reveals itself through the philosophy of Bergson. Deleuze admits that the plain of immanence is not a Bergsonian notion. However, he also claims that it would not be wrong to place the plain of immanence to Bergson for the ease of understanding the nature of movement-image since, Bergson does not offer a movement-image in the sense Deleuze puts forward. Instead, Bergson claims that, as it is put in the “Movement” section of this thesis, intuition starts immediately from the motion itself and considers immobilities as abstractions and snapshots of mobility taken by our minds. This is the critical point in comparison of Bergson and Deleuze since it seems the first critical and basic move that Deleuze did toward Bergsonism.

It could be claimed that what Deleuze defines by **pure immanence** has strong similarities with Bergsonian intuitive epistemology and *élan vital*. The insistence of Deleuze on being immanence’s “a life” (*la vie*) underlies those similarity since Bergson also stresses on the vital power, the power of living beings. Starting from the beginning of *Pure Immanence*, we could reveal Bergson in Deleuze’s philosophy. First, Deleuze defines an empiricism, which is basically defined in terms of intuition and sensation. He does not rely on, as Bergson does not, consciousness and transcendental ideas.

We have to admit that “*A Life ...*” in this sense accommodates almost all elements of Bergsonian philosophy. Deleuze in putting “*A Life ...*” mentions about the stories of Charles Dickens that denotes duration for a life of the protagonist with all his/her choices, affirmations etc. From this point of view, instead of individuality, he also raises singularity as an element in immanence “a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject that incarnated in the midst of

things that made it good or bad” (Deleuze, *Pure Immanence* 29). Besides, the trace that could be followed in *Pure Immanence*, that is from Hume to Nietzsche, is also a way to Bergsonism.

In addition to *Pure Immanence*, we could observe very similar suppositions between Bergsonian intuition and Deleuzian immanence in *What is Philosophy?* in which Deleuze and Guattari define the plane of immanence as follows:

The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought. It is not a method, since every method is concerned with concepts and presupposes such an image. Neither is it a state of knowledge on the brain and its functioning, since thought here is not related to the slow brain as to the scientifically determinable state of affairs in which, whatever its use and orientation, thought is only brought about. Nor is it opinions held about thought, about its forms, ends, and means, at a particular moment (37).

It is not surprising that this definition of immanence is very similar with Bergsonian intuition that intuition is also not a concept and excludes conceptualization as it is mentioned. Although Bergson does not define intuition as Deleuze defines immanence, they could be used interchangeably. This similarity derives us to conclude that the project followed in cinema books can be successfully achieved from Bergsonian terms to the same points. In this respect, it could be claimed that Deleuze, instead of applying Bergsonian philosophy to cinema in its full account, pretends not to see the richness of Bergsonian intuition. Deleuze and Guttari continue in *What is Philosophy?* that “[t]he plane is surrounded by illusions. [...] It is indeed necessary, in part at least, that illusions arise from the plane itself, like vapors from the pond [...]” (49). We could take into account illusions that are mentioned by Bergson in the same discussion.

By traversing Bergsonian intuitive plain into the plane of immanence, Deleuze makes a move toward his film-philosophical approach or philosophical approach in general. As we noticed, Deleuze defines pure immanence by “a life” which has its own duration, creativity and freedom³⁷. Analogously, as we consider in related chapters of this thesis, Bergson insists on the importance of the same for spirituality, duration and intuition. As it will be discussed later, on the way to cinema, Deleuzian philosophical concepts do not bring a novelty since, those are also applicable from the point of view of Bergsonism. To summarize, Bergsonian terminology is efficient enough to consider the movement and time in cinema without the aid of immanency.

4.4. Cinema and philosophy

As it is emphasized, Bergson does not mention about such a plain of immanence. Instead he gives us, as a method, intuition to understand and approach the reality. Deleuze was very aware of the fact that Bergson does not define such an immanency in which movement is immanent to thing in-itself and time is another plain among others with movement. This is crucial point since, by describing the movement and time images and immanency of movement to thing in-itself Deleuze, following Bergson, draws image to the realm of materiality. This is, then, materialism instead of realism and idealism, the project which brings together the denial of the hierarchy of the **beings**, let's say, images, and instead, puts forward the equality of all images. As it is the subject of *Matter and Memory*, then, what is called matter is the “aggregate of images”.

Movement-image and time-image, when conceptualized and when thought in terms of immanence, as Deleuze does, become ontological concepts. As it is mentioned

³⁷ Deleuze does not directly use those terms to define life and immanence. To illustrate the existence of Bergsonian effect on Deleuze and his reading Bergson sometimes we will replace Bergson's

earlier, movement-image and time-image denote material entities and thereby refer to materialism philosophically. In this respect, besides personal interests, cinema becomes a means of philosophical expression. Deleuze puts in *Difference and Repetition*, that “[t]he search for new means of philosophical expression (was begun by Nietzsche) must be pursued today in relation to the renewal of certain other arts, such as the theatre or the cinema”³⁸ (xxi). Deleuze asserts that writing philosophical books became harder and arts would enlarge the gates to it. This is well defined by Gregory Flaxman as follows:

Although art and philosophy are materially different enterprises, the arts can be used to affect a new philosophical style because, Deleuze claims, they are comparable and even compatible. Directors, painters, architects, musicians, and philosophers are essentially “thinkers”³⁹. The difference is that artists, unlike philosophers, do not create concepts; rather, they create “percepts” and “affects,” which are particular to a given medium but which philosophy engage conceptually (3).

What gives cinema such a great importance is the Bergsonian turn in cinema books, where Bergson’s philosophical approach on time and movement, or say, duration and motion that breaks down, philosophically, the Kantian ideals is very important for Deleuze. Cinema, then, is a means of making philosophy that opens new gates to philosophical debates and provides audio-visual examples to the field. This is why Deleuze uses many examples as philosophical indicators from the history of cinema, genres within cinema and social and philosophical theories that are applicable to cinema⁴⁰. Cinema, hence, is a field of inspiration. Flaxman notices “To read the cinema book, then, is to find many of the organizing principles of film studies eradicated, for while Deleuze burrows a great number of the discipline’s historical

terminology in Deleuze’s philosophy.

³⁸ My parenthesis.

³⁹ Movement-Image, ix

⁴⁰ In Cinema books, Deleuze often gives references to lots of thinkers, philosophers like Nietzsche, Foucault, Beckett, Genet, Zola and so on.

commonplaces, the coordinates within which those commonplaces made common sense have left behind” (Flaxman 8).

This could be observed in another work by Deleuze in which he uses Lewis Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland*. In *Logic of Sense* literature, drawing, illustrations and philosophy are interchangeable which is significant from the point of view of philosophizing, as it is mentioned above concerning the relationship between philosophy and cinema, and yet film-philosophy. In this respect, it is not surprising to encounter in *Logic of Sense* and *Cinema* books the same concepts like “chaoscosmos” (Logic of Sense xiii). It is reasonable, therefore, to find in *Time-Image* that “there is always a time, midday-midnight, when we must no longer ask ourselves, ‘What is cinema?’ but ‘What is philosophy?’” (Deleuze 280) which indicates that Deleuze was still applying the project of *What is Philosophy?* to the realm of cinema.

Deterritorialization of image, in this respect, is a part of the philosophical attempt that excludes dialectics and refers to Deleuze’s rhizomatic philosophy. As Cook puts it:

Deterritorialization is the marking of that interval, but also something more: it is a 'rhizomic' marking (see Thousand 3-25) that is concerned with the production of ideas, rather than a reduction or interpretation. Rhizomic ideas are not interested in origins or results, but in 'betweens,' in the breaking-up of structural organizations by examining the relation of forces creating the structure. Asking the question, 'How does it work?,' rather than 'What does it mean?' rhizomes examine the mechanic connection between things (Deterritorialization and the Object: Deleuze across cinema).

As a result, if we trace the terms that are put forward by Deleuze in cinema books and also in his other works, we could conclude that the project is not cinema and

philosophy, rather it is philosophy and cinema, or even philosophy-film. As Claire Perkins calls attention

The image of the cinema being, therefore, ‘automatic’ and presented primarily as movement-image, we have considered under what conditions it is specifically defined into different types." (Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (trans), London: Athlone Press, 1992, p ix.) In this way philosophy is not mapped onto film but film itself *gives rise* to an invented philosophy of thought and image. In the inventiveness of their approach, the *Cinema* books appear as material difference in themselves, for they are less a straightforward matching of philosophy and film than a glimpse of philosophy AND film, philosophy + film, philosophy *and then* film... (Perkins, *Cinephilia and Monstrosity*)

As Frampton also points out, the project that is held in cinema books constructs a relationship between “thought and film”. According to him, Deleuze presents three relationships between cinema and thought, or cinema and philosophy, which are “cinema and a higher Whole (how we think about the Whole); cinema and thought, through the unfolding of images (that is image by image); and cinema and the relationship between world/nature and man/thought (i.e., from concept to image)” (Frampton, *On Deleuze’s Cinema*). This shows that the cinema books are rather philosophical works that reveals the possibilities of **thinking through film**.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This dissertation began with the ideas of Bergson on intuition, motion and duration which are highly important and sometimes hardly comprehensible. Bergsonian novelty on duration and motion are exposed as well as his philosophical method, and the way to Deleuzian Bergsonism is clarified. While doing this, a new Bergsonian project on arts, especially on cinema is discussed, and therefore the way of a new approach is paved for Bergsonian terminology. We also examined Deleuzian **conceptualization** of cinematographic image as encountered with his interpretation of Bergson, and illuminated that Deleuze constructs a hybrid approach in film-philosophy in which he uses Bergsonian concepts claiming that he brought Bergsonism a step further. He acknowledges in *Bergsonism*:

I imagined myself getting onto the back of an author, and giving him a child, which would be his and which would at the same time be a monster. It is very important that it should be his child, because the author actually had to say everything that I made him say. But it also had to be a monster because it was necessary to go through all kinds of decentrings, slips, break ins, secret emissions... (8)

Bergsonian philosophy, for Deleuze, seems to be like a gate to his own philosophical approach that gives permission to construct a cinematographic-philosophical approach, which is then called film-philosophy, although Bergsonian terms are efficient enough to construct a film-philosophy which could be very parallel to the project achieved by Deleuze. As we mentioned, this project is to reveal the relationship between philosophy and cinema, the modern artistic phenomena. “[H]is

ontology derives philosophy *from* cinema by inventing – "giving being" – to a network of terms and images for which a glossary is provided at the end of each volume (Perkins, Cinephilia and Monstrosity). In this respect, philosophy is not a means, but an end. To achieve that project, Deleuze utilizes Bergsonian philosophy by transforming it into his own philosophical approach. On the one hand, this move makes film-philosophy gain new dimensions in the realm of both arts and philosophy. However, on the other hand, to do this also means to disregard some Bergsonian terms that are already capable of opening innovative gates to the very same realm.

Deleuze, by starting from Bergson's ideals, assigns the importance of the reflection of "whole"; history of film as a whole in which he considers individual films. This is the reason that cinema books are full of filmic references from the history of film. This could be considered as another Bergsonian move in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze since, it is very reasonable to assert the same from Bergson's thought that gives a special importance to the evolution as a whole. We could draw the same conclusion from the ideals of change and evolution since those open the gates of creativity and the consideration of any kind of change and evolution lies at the roots of the idea of examining things as a whole in order to give their rights back to them, to create a salvation from the mechanistic work of the intellect that divides, abstracts, generalizes etc. Thought in this way, the genres in cinema can be considered as phases of a transitive period that cannot be separable from one another and cannot be considered in terms of causal relation which could be a mainstream tendency of holding arts defining genres and *écoles* with relation to one another.

The parallelism between cinema and philosophy can be revealed by consulting the term creativity. Following Bergsonian reflections of this term, we could claim that

creativity underlies almost every sort of human action including science. Cinema's creativity, as Deleuze discussed, is invented through the possibilities of montage, field of depth, shot angles and other cinematographical mechanisms. We could consider, therefore, that Deleuze fills the gap in *The Movement-Image* and *The Time-Image*, the gap that arises from the fact that Bergson does not present a theory on cinema but just on cinematographical mechanism of thought. From this reasoning, our basic effort was to show that Deleuze disregards the Bergsonian elements when he criticizes Bergson by not grasping the potentials of his own work *Matter and Memory*.

There is another controversial point in Deleuze's approach in cinema books, which aims to throne cinema to a highest place among other arts. Regarding those statements mentioned above, Deleuze "views cinema as being the highest exercise in thought, brought out from, and in a sense obeying the most basic images and sounds" (Frampton, On Deleuze's Cinema). Accepting this, we ought to turn the relationship between cinema and philosophy in which we could easily demonstrate that cinema books in their own context are the "monster". In her *Cinephilia and Monstrosity* Claire Perkins summarizes this point:

It is in this phenomenon by which the smallest circuit of the books actually spans their apparently extreme poles that we find the radical effect of Deleuze's venture into philosophy and film. For, in engaging the AND between the terms, what Deleuze effectively reveals, [...] is the fact that there is no serious difference between cinema and philosophy. [...] The stammering in the languages of both film and philosophy which the *Cinema* books present – the "child" – is a monstrous system in its inability to move beyond itself, yet, in this smallest circuit, to contain also the broadest circuit between the terms: its AND is finally a flow – monstrosity as cinephilia as philosophy....

Therefore, cinema books can be held as a threshold to a new field which opens the possibility of creating a new approach toward cinema. However, in considering this

Deleuzian presentation, as in the case of cinema books that need a profound knowledge of both film and philosophy, one should consider the possibilities of Bergson's concepts in order to give him his due. This monster, not in the sense that it is frightening, but in the sense that it eats one of his parents, could be considered in many aspects as the starting point of which is constructed by Gilles Deleuze through Bergson's philosophy.

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